Category: One.Energy Magazine

  • Seacor Marine: when the fleet may be worth more than the company

    Seacor Marine: when the fleet may be worth more than the company

    Shareholder pressure has pushed Seacor Marine into a strategic review. The vessels appear valuable, but the real question is whether the company can produce an adequate return from operating them

    Seacor Marine has confirmed that it is evaluating a sale, merger, business combination or further asset disposals following pressure from significant shareholders.

    The argument presented to the board is apparently simple: Seacor’s modern offshore fleet is worth considerably more than the company’s market capitalisation. Therefore, selling the company—or its vessels—could unlock value currently denied to shareholders.

    But shares do not operate vessels. They do not secure contracts, maintain class, improve uptime or produce cash flow. A shipping company ultimately derives its value from the quality of its assets, operational reliability, commercial performance and ability to generate returns.

    That is precisely where the Seacor discussion becomes more complex.

    Valuable steel, disappointing returns

    Pointillist Family Office, which holds approximately 7.2% of Seacor, estimates the company’s PSVs at between US$500 million and US$550 million, its fast support vessels at US$240 million to US$280 million and its liftboats at US$110 million to US$150 million.

    The component valuations total between US$850 million and US$980 million. Pointillist argues that, together with the company’s other assets, they support an enterprise value exceeding US$1 billion and a net asset value above US$20 per share.

    There is evidence that Seacor’s vessels are carried below market value.

    During 2025, the company received US$129.2 million from asset sales and recognised gains of US$63.4 million. The assets sold therefore had a combined book value of only around US$65.8 million. Selected vessels were sold for almost twice their carrying value.

    The same pattern continued in the second quarter of 2026, when five vessels and other equipment produced US$44.7 million in proceeds and a gain of US$31.3 million.

    The hidden asset value is not imaginary. The problem is that an appraisal is not cash, and gross fleet value is not equity value.

    Debt must be repaid. Newbuild instalments remain outstanding. Transaction costs, taxes, corporate liabilities and eventual wind-down expenses must also be considered. Moreover, a large fleet sold together will not necessarily achieve the combined value of each vessel sold separately.

    Offshore Accounts estimates that whole-fleet transactions can attract a discount of approximately 20%, primarily because the universe of buyers capable of funding a major acquisition is considerably smaller than the universe capable of purchasing one or two vessels.

    Seacor Congo
    Seacor Congo (Source: Seacor/Courtesy)

    Seacor’s Jones Act exposure further limits the range of potential corporate buyers.

    The claimed value is therefore plausible, but far from guaranteed.

    The economics explain the pressure

    The more significant problem is not Seacor’s share price. It is the performance of the underlying company.

    In 2025, Seacor generated US$227.8 million in revenue and US$46.1 million in direct vessel profit. General and administrative expenses—commonly referred to as G&A—reached US$47.5 million.

    In other words, the entire direct contribution from the fleet was insufficient to pay for the corporate structure, even before depreciation and US$36.1 million of interest expense.

    Seacor ended the year with a net loss of US$27.8 million and negative operating cash flow of US$36.4 million. Once capital expenditure is included, the business consumed approximately US$85 million before receiving proceeds from vessel sales.

    The second quarter of 2026 was not fundamentally different.

    Seacor reported net income of US$3.3 million, but this included the US$31.3 million gain on asset disposals. Excluding that gain, the underlying operating result was negative by approximately US$15.4 million. Operating cash flow remained negative by US$13.2 million.

    The fleet is producing some encouraging results. PSV rates reached US$28,443 per day in the second quarter, with utilisation of 70%, while FSV utilisation reached 74%.

    The liftboats, however, recorded utilisation of only 24%. Two premium units in the Middle East remain under maintenance and were not expected to operate during the third quarter.

    Selling vessels has helped protect liquidity and demonstrate their market value. But every disposal also removes part of the company’s revenue-producing base.

    Unless overhead falls at approximately the same pace, each sale makes the remaining company progressively more expensive to operate.

    Seacor and Tidewater in 2025

    Seacor MarineTidewater
    RevenueUS$227.8MUS$1.35Bn
    Fleet utilisation66.0%76.1%
    Average day rateUS$18,899US$22,573
    G&A as percentage of revenue20.8%9.9%
    Operating cash flowUS$(36.4)MUS$379.1M

    Why Tidewater receives a premium

    The comparison with Tidewater is particularly revealing.

    Tidewater operated 208 vessels at the end of 2025, generating US$1.35 billion in revenue, US$598.1 million in adjusted EBITDA and US$379.1 million in operating cash flow.

    Its G&A was significantly higher in absolute terms, at US$134.5 million, but represented only 9.9% of revenue and approximately US$630,000 per vessel. At Seacor, G&A represented 20.8% of revenue and more than US$1 million per vessel.

    Campos Tide, Tidewater vessel
    Campos Tide, a Tidewater vessel (Source: Courtesy)

    Tidewater’s fleet was also older on average. This did not prevent the company from producing considerably better utilisation, cash flow and returns.

    This is the essential point: the market is not valuing Tidewater’s steel alone. It is valuing an operating platform capable of converting vessels into earnings.

    Scale allows Tidewater to distribute the cost of management, compliance, crewing, technical support and commercial coverage across a much larger fleet. It also provides greater flexibility to reposition vessels, offer substitute tonnage and manage maintenance without disproportionately damaging the wider business.

    Operational reliability matters because it converts nominal asset value into working days. Working days generate revenue. Revenue, when properly managed, produces cash.

    Creating value—or merely realising it?

    “Maximising shareholder value” can become an empty financial-market expression. In Seacor’s case, however, it describes three materially different possibilities.

    Improving utilisation, resolving the liftboats, reducing G&A and lowering debt would genuinely create value through better business performance.

    Selling or merging Seacor into a larger operator could also create industrial value if the buyer can employ the vessels more efficiently, remove duplicated overhead and finance the fleet at a lower cost.

    Selling vessels individually would be different. It would realise value already contained in the assets, rather than create new value.

    The danger lies in continuing to sell ships without resolving the future of the company. Asset gains may temporarily improve reported results, but an increasingly small fleet cannot indefinitely support a corporate structure designed for a much larger operation.

    The strategic review is therefore rational. It does not, by itself, create value. It merely tests whether another owner is prepared to pay more for Seacor’s vessels than Seacor can justify through its own operating returns.

    The fleet countdown

    The development of Seacor’s fleet and G&A provides perhaps the clearest summary of the problem.

    PeriodPeriod-end vesselsReported G&AApproximate G&A per vessel
    202358US$49.2MUS$0.85M
    202454US$44.7MUS$0.83M
    202544US$47.5MUS$1.08M
    June 202638US$22.3M for six monthsUS$1.17M annualised

    The 2026 indicator simply annualises the first-half G&A of US$22.3 million. It is not company guidance, and period-end vessel counts are an imperfect denominator, but the direction remains significant.

    Between the end of 2023 and June 2026, Seacor’s fleet declined from 58 to 38 vessels—a reduction of approximately 35%.

    Over the same interval, annualised G&A declined by only about 9%. As a result, the approximate corporate cost allocated to each remaining vessel increased from US$850,000 to almost US$1.2 million.

    G&A does not have to move in a perfectly straight line with vessel numbers. A listed company retains audit, legal, compliance and management costs regardless of fleet size. International operations and a diverse fleet also require technical and commercial infrastructure.

    But fixed costs are not permanently exempt from economic reality. If a company sells more than one-third of its vessels, the organisation supporting those vessels must eventually be redesigned.

    The comparison with Maersk is instructive, although the businesses are not direct peers.

    Maersk officially lists “Our employees” as one of its five core values. Nevertheless, when market conditions and its cost base changed, it announced the elimination of approximately 10,000 positions in 2023.

    In 2026, it announced another restructuring under which around 1,000 corporate positions—approximately 15% of its corporate workforce—would be closed, targeting an annual reduction of US$180 million in corporate overhead.

    Skandi Logger
    Skandi Logger, former Maersk Logger (Source: DOF/Courtesy)

    That is a severe decision and not, by itself, evidence of good management. But it demonstrates an important principle: placing people at the centre of a company does not exempt management from aligning the organisation with the economics of the business.

    In fact, protecting the company and its remaining employment may require management to act before an oversized cost structure consumes cash, increases debt and weakens the operating platform.

    Maersk’s decision was specifically directed at corporate overhead. Seacor’s disclosures, by contrast, show a fleet that has already been materially reduced without an equivalent adjustment to G&A.

    This is the point Seacor’s strategic review must address. Selling vessels while leaving the corporate structure substantially unchanged is not a sustainable restructuring. It progressively transfers more overhead onto fewer revenue-producing assets.

    The emerging conclusion is uncomfortable but increasingly difficult to avoid: Seacor may own a valuable fleet, but the present organisation may no longer be its highest-value owner.

    The eventual outcome will depend not on the enthusiasm of the share market, but on something considerably more concrete—the net cash a buyer is prepared to pay after debt, liabilities, remaining commitments and execution risk.

    The final numbers summarise the issue:

    58 vessels. Then 54. Then 44. Now 38.

    The fleet has been resized. G&A has not been resized with it.

    Unless the strategic review changes that equation—through operational improvement, corporate restructuring or a new owner—the vessels may be worth more elsewhere precisely because Seacor has not demonstrated that it can earn enough from operating them.

  • One Energy magazine – New edition

    One Energy magazine – New edition

    The 19th edition of OneEnergy magazine, published by Westhon Media, features an exclusive interview with Rogério Ibrahim, CEO of Foresea. The issue also highlights Wärtsilä‘s presence in Brazil, along with profiles of Maria Ciriaco and Vanessa Costa, two of Westhon‘s key professionals.

    Also in this edition:

    – Columns by Romulo Augusto Bacchiega and Fernando Vilela CMO at WSB Advisors

    – The latest offshore and maritime market news

    – Editorial: Brazil has spent decades financing ships. Perhaps it is time to start building shipowners

    Click here to read: https://lnkd.in/d_Hmkrz5

  • Editorial: Brazil has spent decades financing ships. Perhaps it is time to start building shipowners

    Editorial: Brazil has spent decades financing ships. Perhaps it is time to start building shipowners

    The dispute surrounding Capital Marítima has exposed a question that reaches far beyond one company: whether Brazil’s maritime policy is preserving not only vessels and jobs, but also the entrepreneurs, intellectual capital and industrial capability required to sustain a genuinely national shipping industry

    By Westhon Media

    For generations, Brazilian shipping was shaped by companies closely identified with their founders: Wilson Sons; CBO under the Fischer family; São Miguel and Bravante under Marcelino and Renato Nascimento following their father; Comte Matos and William, Astromaritima; Camorim; and, more recently, OceanPact and Posidonia. Despite different histories and business models, they accumulated something more important than vessels alone: Brazilian entrepreneurial, technical and institutional capital.

    Operating in Brazil required knowledge of Petrobras and international oil companies, shipyards, banks, ANTAQ, the Navy, unions, crews and repeated market cycles. Mobilisation failures, vessel downtime, financial crises and regulatory changes produced experience that remained within the country. This intangible capital, commercial credibility, engineering judgement, institutional memory and operational discipline, is difficult to value, but it is what distinguishes an established shipowner from a newly incorporated vehicle that merely controls a fleet.

    Camorim shipyard, at Niterói (RJ)
    Camorim shipyard, at Niterói (RJ) (Source: Camorim)

    Over the past two decades, the Brazilian market has changed, drastically. International investors, foreign shipping groups and private equity have expanded, while Brazilian operators have increasingly been acquired or integrated into structures spanning several jurisdictions. More sophisticated financing and ownership arrangements are not inherently negative. Shipping depends on global capital, technology and expertise, and Brazil should continue to welcome international organized and transparent participation.

    The strategic question is whether the country is also preserving its capacity to create and strengthen Brazilian shipowners, and reserving due care to investigating the foreign entities involved. A nation can finance vessels, generate contracts and maintain employment while gradually transferring decision-making, intellectual property, commercial relationships and accumulated expertise abroad. Ships may continue to fly the Brazilian flag even as the industry’s economic and intellectual substance migrates elsewhere.

    Capital Marítima offers a visible example of this broader issue, not because foreign ownership necessarily causes poor governance, but because the dispute has shown how uncertainty over control, authority, assets and responsibility can quickly affect employees, clients, suppliers, vessels and commercial relationships built over years.

    A dispute that escaped the boardroom

    Capital Marítima developed from Embrareb, a Brazilian company associated with entrepreneur Plínio Calenzo, and later came to include Constance Maritime, incorporated in Monrovia, Liberia, alongside interests commercially associated with the Capital Offshore name. What might ordinarily have remained a dispute over shares, management and corporate authority soon reached the company’s workforce, commercial counterparties and vessel operations.

    Negotiations with shore-based employees have progressed since One Energy first reported on the dispute, and some workers indicated their willingness to accept a settlement proposed by the company. At the time of publication, however, the agreements had not yet been formally executed by the administration. The immediate tensions may have eased, but the company’s institutional position remains unsettled. Further, the technical challenges surrounding the ACE Defender with Petrobras and the Brazilian Navy have come to a halt.

    The situation became more serious in labour proceedings involving the ACE Defender, when the court ordered the arrest of the vessel after considering the risk that a future judgment might be difficult to enforce, particularly in light of the assets available in Brazil and the opacity attributed to the corporate structure supporting the operation. Petrobras, as the recipient of the vessel’s services, was also instructed to make a judicial deposit up to the value claimed.

    The arrest does not constitute a final finding of liability. It does, however, reveal a practical concern: when a vessel operates in Brazil but ownership, management, employment, financing, guarantees and material assets are distributed abroad, the reach of Brazilian jurisdiction may be less secure than the obligations created within the country. The same weakness that may prevent an employee from recovering a legitimate indemnity can affect suppliers, creditors and commercial partners attempting to enforce guarantees or contractual rights against foreign group assets.

    The corporate dispute has also entered arbitration. After being informed that an emergency arbitrator had been appointed, the 7th Corporate Court of Rio de Janeiro suspended an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting intended to consider claims against shareholders and administrators. The judge concluded that prudence required avoiding further escalation until the appropriate arbitral forum had been established and prospectively set aside the effects of any resolution adopted in breach of the order, which was followed by the arbitrator.

    The decision neither settles the control dispute nor invalidates every act of the administration currently in place. It confirms, however, that the company’s governance remains contested and subject to interim measures while arbitration proceeds.

    The sequence bears some of the characteristics of an aggressive takeover: provisional authority is obtained, operational and commercial channels are occupied rapidly, and practical consequences emerge well before the legal dispute can be finally resolved. Whether this was a deliberate strategy in the Capital case is for the courts and the arbitral tribunal to determine. What is already evident is that those assuming control appear not to have anticipated the commercial damage caused by acting before authority, representation and stakeholder relationships had been stabilized.

    A more experienced maritime transition would ordinarily seek to preserve continuity while the shareholder dispute proceeded in parallel. Instead, relationships and opportunities developed over years were exposed to immediate disruption. One Energy has confirmed that a major international client requested documentary confirmation of the authority of Capital Marítima’s current controllers on an ongoing competitive process. The required confirmation was not produced within the requested timeframe, and negotiations involving offers that had already reached the award stage were terminated.

    That episode shows how quickly provisional corporate power can destroy permanent commercial value. Often clients cannot wait for arbitration. They must secure tonnage, preserve schedules and manage risk, and they will usually move to another option when representation or vessel availability cannot be confirmed.

    What Brazil loses when it loses a shipowner

    The significance of the Capital case extends beyond the dispute itself. It brings into view the internationalisation not only of capital and control, but also of industrial knowledge, commercial intelligence and entrepreneurial capability.

    Brazilian maritime policy has historically concentrated on tangible assets: domestic construction, Brazilian-flag tonnage, REB registration, local content and financing through the Merchant Marine Fund. These instruments remain important, but ships alone do not create shipowners.

    ANTAQ headquarter
    ANTAQ headquarter (Source: Courtesy)

    A maritime company depends on accumulated capital, access to charterers, regulatory knowledge, engineering capability, financial expertise, experienced management and the ability to survive long periods of weak markets. This capability resides in people, systems, relationships and judgement, and it takes years to develop.

    Every contract performed in Brazil produces knowledge. Vessel data is collected, maintenance systems are refined, crews gain experience, engineering solutions are developed and commercial teams learn how particular clients assess risk. The strategic question is who retains and monetises that knowledge.

    When a Brazilian operator is absorbed into an international group, its legal entity may remain in the country while procurement, engineering, financial strategy, operational data and client relationships become centralised abroad. Brazilian workers continue to perform the activity, but the higher-value capability created by their experience may no longer accumulate within a Brazilian enterprise.

    This transformation is rarely dramatic. It occurs through acquisitions, management agreements and the gradual migration of strategic functions. The country continues to host vessels and crews while losing the capacity to create companies that control technology, capital and international expansion. Losing a shipowner can therefore mean losing an ecosystem of knowledge assembled over an entire generation.

    The unequal cost of building a shipowner

    The imbalance becomes clearer when the conditions faced by Brazilian entrepreneurs are compared with those available to international competitors. Local companies operate with expensive capital, volatile exchange rates, complex taxation, demanding collateral requirements and recurrent regulatory and judicial uncertainty. Offshore assets require substantial investment, while the revenue supporting them depends on contracts that may be delayed, contested or terminated.

    International groups often enter Brazil with access to deeper capital markets, export-credit agencies, established banking relationships and fleets capable of spreading risk across several regions. They may use cash flow generated elsewhere to acquire Brazilian companies or assets precisely when local operators are financially vulnerable.

    Competition therefore takes place not only between companies, but between national industrial ecosystems.

    When a foreign group acquires a Brazilian operator, it may gain approved-vendor status, licences, local registrations, trained personnel, regulatory knowledge and access to commercial relationships developed over many years, notwithstanding the extremely competitive financing mechanisms available – while they can present foreign guarantees. The Brazilian entrepreneur often created these assets under far less favourable financial conditions.

    The result is unlikely to be the disappearance of maritime activity from Brazil. The market is too attractive. The quieter consequence is that Brazilian entrepreneurs may increasingly become minority partners, local representatives or service providers within structures financed and controlled elsewhere. Brazil preserves the operations while losing more of their economic ownership.

    That outcome should not be blamed on foreign investors, who are acting,most of the time, rationally. It is principally a policy question. Other countries support the international expansion of their maritime companies through finance, guarantees, taxation and coordinated industrial policies. The absence of comparable support in Brazil is itself a choice, and it generally favours those arriving with the strongest backing.

    Partnership requires substance

    Brazil does not need to choose between domestic entrepreneurship and foreign investment. It needs partnerships that strengthen both. International groups can bring scale, technology, financial discipline and improved operating standards, but the local side should not be reduced to providing licences, market access and execution while the strategic value is accumulated elsewhere.

    A country should defend its own entrepreneurs in partnership with the world; it should not merely defend the world’s entrepreneurs through partnerships with its own.

    This does not justify protecting inefficient companies simply because they are Brazilian. Public support should require transparency, sound governance, safety, investment and the creation of lasting domestic capability. Nor should foreign-controlled groups be presumed less committed to Brazil, unless they really are. The relevant distinction is not nationality alone, but economic substance, accountability and contribution to the local industrial base.

    Brazil should aim not only to host international shipowners, but also to create Brazilian companies capable of becoming international shipowners themselves.

    Financing companies, not only ships

    Starnav is a Brazilian shipping company (EBN) owned by the Chilean Detroit Group
    Starnav is a Brazilian shipping company (EBN) owned by the Chilean Detroit Group (Source: Starnav/Courtesy)

    For decades, Brazilian maritime policy treated the construction and financing of vessels as its central challenge. The logic was reasonable: domestic orders would create employment, engineering capability and an industrial supply chain. But financing a vessel does not necessarily create a sustainable shipowner. Maybe it better benefits an existing and capitalized one, and not local.

    The company must also possess working capital, commercial strength, governance and the balance sheet required to absorb delays, cost overruns, technical failures and periods without revenue. A vessel depreciates; a successful shipowner can accumulate value through credibility, systems, knowledge and access to progressively better financing.

    The most valuable outcome of public support should therefore be an enterprise capable of ordering its next vessel with less dependence on the same support. Brazil should measure not only how many ships were delivered, but how many stronger, more transparent and internationally competitive companies were created. And to start, they must created from zero.

    That requires policy instruments directed at the enterprise itself: competitive capital, guarantees, governance standards, technology, data, management development and support for international expansion. Shipbuilding and entrepreneurial formation should be parts of the same strategy.

    What should count as a Brazilian shipping company?

    The transformation of the sector also raises a regulatory question. The current definition of a Brazilian Shipping Company places considerable weight on incorporation, authorisation, flag, registration and tonnage. Those criteria remain relevant, but they may no longer be sufficient measures of national economic substance.

    A company may be incorporated in Brazil, employ Brazilian crews and operate Brazilian-flagged vessels while its decision-making, guarantees, intellectual property and strategic assets remain abroad. Another may receive foreign capital while retaining management, technical capability, assets and reinvestment substantially in Brazil. Formally similar companies may therefore contribute very differently to national development and present different levels of accountability before Brazilian jurisdiction.

    A modern framework should not rely on crude ownership restrictions. It could instead consider transparency of ultimate ownership and everything in-between, the location of effective management, the availability of assets and guarantees in Brazil, the authority of local administration, reinvestment, professional training, research and development, and the participation of Brazilian entrepreneurs in economic decision-making.

    The purpose would not be to exclude internationally controlled companies, but to align access to public support, strategic protections and preferential financing with verifiable economic substance.

    Capital Marítima does not answer this debate, and its dispute should not be used to generalise about every foreign-linked operator. It does, however, show how quickly uncertainty over place, control, authority and assets can affect workers, courts, clients and commercial partners, and how an aggressive transition under provisional authority can destroy value before the underlying legal dispute reaches a final outcome.

    More than a maritime market

    Brazil must decide what it expects from maritime policy. If the objective is merely to ensure the availability of vessels, international capital can provide them whenever demand and contract terms justify the investment. Sort of what is happening now with larger demand and the ageing fleet. If the country also wants to preserve national industrial capability, its policies must support companies that retain technical knowledge, financial substance, commercial intelligence and effective decision-making in Brazil.

    This does not require protectionism. It requires incentives and standards that distinguish between structures that merely use Brazilian registrations, contracts and flag arrangements and those that build durable companies, skills and accountability within the country.

    The Capital Marítima case does not resolve this question, but it illustrates the cost of ignoring it. When control, assets, guarantees and authority are distributed across jurisdictions, a shareholder dispute can quickly affect vessels, employees, clients, suppliers and contracts. Formal Brazilian status alone does not ensure operational continuity or effective accountability.

    Brazilian policy has spent decades addressing how ships should be financed. Its next challenge is to create competitive shipowners capable of attracting international capital, retaining industrial knowledge, answering effectively to Brazilian jurisdiction and expanding beyond the domestic market. That is the practical distinction between remaining a maritime industry and becoming merely a maritime market.

    Editor’s note: One Energy has sought comments and documentary clarification from Capital Marítima, Constance Maritime and representatives associated with the administration currently in place. The publication remains open to further documents, clarification and the exercise of the right of reply. Interim court orders, labour claims and arbitral proceedings do not constitute final findings of liability, and all persons and companies mentioned remain entitled to due process and a full opportunity to present their position.