Tsakos Energy Navigation has taken delivery of the 154,850 dwt DP2 Suezmax shuttle tanker Anfield DP from Samsung Heavy Industries.
The vessel will begin a ten-year charter with a U.S. oil major, with extension options that could keep it employed until its 20th anniversary.
Anfield DP is the third vessel delivered under TEN’s current programme of 12 new DP2 shuttle tankers. The company now operates seven units and has nine more on order, taking its shuttle tanker fleet to 16 vessels by the end of 2028.
The scale and duration of the programme reflect the long-term capacity being committed to Brazil’s offshore market
Seadrill’s drillship West Carina has completed its drilling and completion campaign in the Búzios field after more than three years of operations.
According to the company, the rig delivered 18 wells while supporting the expanded use of Managed Pressure Drilling in one of Petrobras’ most technically demanding offshore developments.
West Carina also became the first rig in Seadrill’s fleet to deploy Pressurized Mud Cap Drilling and Floating Mud Cap Drilling techniques.
In a previous operation disclosed by Seadrill, the use of PMCD reduced drilling time from 32 to 12 days, illustrating the potential impact of the technology in challenging pre-salt formations.
The drillship remained in Brazil through successive contract extensions, with its latest term running through June 2026.
Seadrill has not disclosed the rig’s next assignment.
Shareholder pressure has pushed Seacor Marine into a strategic review. The vessels appear valuable, but the real question is whether the company can produce an adequate return from operating them
Seacor Marine has confirmed that it is evaluating a sale, merger, business combination or further asset disposals following pressure from significant shareholders.
The argument presented to the board is apparently simple: Seacor’s modern offshore fleet is worth considerably more than the company’s market capitalisation. Therefore, selling the company—or its vessels—could unlock value currently denied to shareholders.
But shares do not operate vessels. They do not secure contracts, maintain class, improve uptime or produce cash flow. A shipping company ultimately derives its value from the quality of its assets, operational reliability, commercial performance and ability to generate returns.
That is precisely where the Seacor discussion becomes more complex.
Valuable steel, disappointing returns
Pointillist Family Office, which holds approximately 7.2% of Seacor, estimates the company’s PSVs at between US$500 million and US$550 million, its fast support vessels at US$240 million to US$280 million and its liftboats at US$110 million to US$150 million.
The component valuations total between US$850 million and US$980 million. Pointillist argues that, together with the company’s other assets, they support an enterprise value exceeding US$1 billion and a net asset value above US$20 per share.
There is evidence that Seacor’s vessels are carried below market value.
During 2025, the company received US$129.2 million from asset sales and recognised gains of US$63.4 million. The assets sold therefore had a combined book value of only around US$65.8 million. Selected vessels were sold for almost twice their carrying value.
The same pattern continued in the second quarter of 2026, when five vessels and other equipment produced US$44.7 million in proceeds and a gain of US$31.3 million.
The hidden asset value is not imaginary. The problem is that an appraisal is not cash, and gross fleet value is not equity value.
Debt must be repaid. Newbuild instalments remain outstanding. Transaction costs, taxes, corporate liabilities and eventual wind-down expenses must also be considered. Moreover, a large fleet sold together will not necessarily achieve the combined value of each vessel sold separately.
Offshore Accounts estimates that whole-fleet transactions can attract a discount of approximately 20%, primarily because the universe of buyers capable of funding a major acquisition is considerably smaller than the universe capable of purchasing one or two vessels.
Seacor Congo (Source: Seacor/Courtesy)
Seacor’s Jones Act exposure further limits the range of potential corporate buyers.
The claimed value is therefore plausible, but far from guaranteed.
The economics explain the pressure
The more significant problem is not Seacor’s share price. It is the performance of the underlying company.
In 2025, Seacor generated US$227.8 million in revenue and US$46.1 million in direct vessel profit. General and administrative expenses—commonly referred to as G&A—reached US$47.5 million.
In other words, the entire direct contribution from the fleet was insufficient to pay for the corporate structure, even before depreciation and US$36.1 million of interest expense.
Seacor ended the year with a net loss of US$27.8 million and negative operating cash flow of US$36.4 million. Once capital expenditure is included, the business consumed approximately US$85 million before receiving proceeds from vessel sales.
The second quarter of 2026 was not fundamentally different.
Seacor reported net income of US$3.3 million, but this included the US$31.3 million gain on asset disposals. Excluding that gain, the underlying operating result was negative by approximately US$15.4 million. Operating cash flow remained negative by US$13.2 million.
The fleet is producing some encouraging results. PSV rates reached US$28,443 per day in the second quarter, with utilisation of 70%, while FSV utilisation reached 74%.
The liftboats, however, recorded utilisation of only 24%. Two premium units in the Middle East remain under maintenance and were not expected to operate during the third quarter.
Selling vessels has helped protect liquidity and demonstrate their market value. But every disposal also removes part of the company’s revenue-producing base.
Unless overhead falls at approximately the same pace, each sale makes the remaining company progressively more expensive to operate.
Seacor and Tidewater in 2025
Seacor Marine
Tidewater
Revenue
US$227.8M
US$1.35Bn
Fleet utilisation
66.0%
76.1%
Average day rate
US$18,899
US$22,573
G&A as percentage of revenue
20.8%
9.9%
Operating cash flow
US$(36.4)M
US$379.1M
Why Tidewater receives a premium
The comparison with Tidewater is particularly revealing.
Tidewater operated 208 vessels at the end of 2025, generating US$1.35 billion in revenue, US$598.1 million in adjusted EBITDA and US$379.1 million in operating cash flow.
Its G&A was significantly higher in absolute terms, at US$134.5 million, but represented only 9.9% of revenue and approximately US$630,000 per vessel. At Seacor, G&A represented 20.8% of revenue and more than US$1 million per vessel.
Campos Tide, a Tidewater vessel (Source: Courtesy)
Tidewater’s fleet was also older on average. This did not prevent the company from producing considerably better utilisation, cash flow and returns.
This is the essential point: the market is not valuing Tidewater’s steel alone. It is valuing an operating platform capable of converting vessels into earnings.
Scale allows Tidewater to distribute the cost of management, compliance, crewing, technical support and commercial coverage across a much larger fleet. It also provides greater flexibility to reposition vessels, offer substitute tonnage and manage maintenance without disproportionately damaging the wider business.
Operational reliability matters because it converts nominal asset value into working days. Working days generate revenue. Revenue, when properly managed, produces cash.
Creating value—or merely realising it?
“Maximising shareholder value” can become an empty financial-market expression. In Seacor’s case, however, it describes three materially different possibilities.
Improving utilisation, resolving the liftboats, reducing G&A and lowering debt would genuinely create value through better business performance.
Selling or merging Seacor into a larger operator could also create industrial value if the buyer can employ the vessels more efficiently, remove duplicated overhead and finance the fleet at a lower cost.
Selling vessels individually would be different. It would realise value already contained in the assets, rather than create new value.
The danger lies in continuing to sell ships without resolving the future of the company. Asset gains may temporarily improve reported results, but an increasingly small fleet cannot indefinitely support a corporate structure designed for a much larger operation.
The strategic review is therefore rational. It does not, by itself, create value. It merely tests whether another owner is prepared to pay more for Seacor’s vessels than Seacor can justify through its own operating returns.
The fleet countdown
The development of Seacor’s fleet and G&A provides perhaps the clearest summary of the problem.
Period
Period-end vessels
Reported G&A
Approximate G&A per vessel
2023
58
US$49.2M
US$0.85M
2024
54
US$44.7M
US$0.83M
2025
44
US$47.5M
US$1.08M
June 2026
38
US$22.3M for six months
US$1.17M annualised
The 2026 indicator simply annualises the first-half G&A of US$22.3 million. It is not company guidance, and period-end vessel counts are an imperfect denominator, but the direction remains significant.
Between the end of 2023 and June 2026, Seacor’s fleet declined from 58 to 38 vessels—a reduction of approximately 35%.
Over the same interval, annualised G&A declined by only about 9%. As a result, the approximate corporate cost allocated to each remaining vessel increased from US$850,000 to almost US$1.2 million.
G&A does not have to move in a perfectly straight line with vessel numbers. A listed company retains audit, legal, compliance and management costs regardless of fleet size. International operations and a diverse fleet also require technical and commercial infrastructure.
But fixed costs are not permanently exempt from economic reality. If a company sells more than one-third of its vessels, the organisation supporting those vessels must eventually be redesigned.
The comparison with Maersk is instructive, although the businesses are not direct peers.
Maersk officially lists “Our employees” as one of its five core values. Nevertheless, when market conditions and its cost base changed, it announced the elimination of approximately 10,000 positions in 2023.
In 2026, it announced another restructuring under which around 1,000 corporate positions—approximately 15% of its corporate workforce—would be closed, targeting an annual reduction of US$180 million in corporate overhead.
Skandi Logger, former Maersk Logger (Source: DOF/Courtesy)
That is a severe decision and not, by itself, evidence of good management. But it demonstrates an important principle: placing people at the centre of a company does not exempt management from aligning the organisation with the economics of the business.
In fact, protecting the company and its remaining employment may require management to act before an oversized cost structure consumes cash, increases debt and weakens the operating platform.
Maersk’s decision was specifically directed at corporate overhead. Seacor’s disclosures, by contrast, show a fleet that has already been materially reduced without an equivalent adjustment to G&A.
This is the point Seacor’s strategic review must address. Selling vessels while leaving the corporate structure substantially unchanged is not a sustainable restructuring. It progressively transfers more overhead onto fewer revenue-producing assets.
The emerging conclusion is uncomfortable but increasingly difficult to avoid: Seacor may own a valuable fleet, but the present organisation may no longer be its highest-value owner.
The eventual outcome will depend not on the enthusiasm of the share market, but on something considerably more concrete—the net cash a buyer is prepared to pay after debt, liabilities, remaining commitments and execution risk.
The final numbers summarise the issue:
58 vessels. Then 54. Then 44. Now 38.
The fleet has been resized. G&A has not been resized with it.
Unless the strategic review changes that equation—through operational improvement, corporate restructuring or a new owner—the vessels may be worth more elsewhere precisely because Seacor has not demonstrated that it can earn enough from operating them.
DOF has secured contract extensions with Petrobras for the PLSVs Skandi Búzios and Skandi Recife, keeping both vessels in operation offshore Brazil through January 2028.
Skandi Búzios received a 516-day extension, while Skandi Recife was awarded an additional 550 days. Their existing contracts were previously scheduled to expire in the third quarter of 2026.
The vessels are owned through a joint venture between DOF and TechnipFMC, with each company holding a 50% interest.
Skandi Búzios and Skandi Recife have operated for Petrobras under long-term contracts since 2017 and 2018, respectively. Both are designed for flexible pipelay and umbilical installation in Brazil’s deep and ultra-deep waters.
The extensions maintain two high-capacity PLSVs under contract with Petrobras as subsea activity continues offshore Brazil.
Petrobras has revoked its tender for the charter of up to two newbuild AHTS vessels before the opening of proposals.
According to the official notice, the company reassessed the assumptions that supported the procurement, the need for the contracting and its corporate priorities following an economic review of its projects.
Petrobras concluded that continuing the tender was no longer convenient under the revised conditions.
The decision follows a prolonged procurement process marked by repeated extensions.
More than a year after suffering a major engine room fire, Bram Force has returned to offshore operations in Brazil, once again working in the Campos Basin.
Delivered by Navship in 2017, the Brazilian-flagged AHTS is part of Bram Offshore, the Brazilian subsidiary of Edison Chouest Offshore.
On 8 January 2025, while operating near Petrobras’ P-37, the vessel experienced an engine room fire. The crew was safely evacuated by a nearby Maersk vessel, firefighting operations lasted approximately 12 hours, and no injuries or pollution were reported.
Following the casualty, the vessel was towed to the Port of Açu, where the Brazilian Navy initiated an Administrative Inquiry. After the extent of the damage was assessed, Bram Force underwent an extensive repair programme at Navship in Itajaí, the same shipyard where she was originally built.
AIS data now confirms that the vessel has resumed offshore service.
For most companies, restoring an offshore support vessel after a major engine room casualty is neither a quick nor an inexpensive decision. Beyond the technical complexity, owners must balance repair costs, downtime, commercial commitments and the long-term value of the asset.
Bram Offshore chose restoration.
The return of Bram Force illustrates a reality often overlooked outside the industry: modern offshore vessels are strategic assets, and in many cases rebuilding them is both technically feasible and commercially justified.
Its return also reflects the work of shipyard teams, class societies, equipment manufacturers, regulators and the vessel’s owner to bring a complex offshore asset safely back into service.
In shipping, success is rarely measured by avoiding every incident. It is measured by how professionally companies respond when incidents occur.
Mauá Shipyard has announced the completion of three strategic initiatives aimed at strengthening its position in the shipbuilding and offshore markets. The measures include obtaining Tax Clearance Certificates (Certidões Negativas de Débito, or CNDs), achieving compliance with the NORSOK M-501 standard for coating systems 7B and 7C, and modernizing its planning and control system.
According to the company, the tax clearance certificates were obtained after more than 15 years, confirming the regularization of its municipal, state and federal tax obligations. The achievement removes an important barrier to the shipyard’s participation in public tenders and government procurement processes.
In May 2026, the shipyard also obtained certification of compliance with NORSOK M-501 for coating systems 7B and 7C, an international standard widely adopted by the oil and gas industry. To achieve the certification, Mauá invested in workforce training and a dedicated temperature-controlled painting facility designed to support offshore and subsea applications.
The company has also implemented a new planning and control model that combines traditional project management practices with agile methodologies. According to Mauá, the system uses technology and artificial intelligence to manage its project portfolio more efficiently, with the aim of improving operational performance and delivery predictability.
“After more than 15 years, Mauá and EISA shipyards have obtained their Tax Clearance Certificates from the municipal, state and federal authorities. This achievement is the result of a lengthy negotiation process through which we were able to renegotiate and restructure all of the shipyards’ tax liabilities. It represents an important step in the consolidation of our judicial reorganization plan, allowing us to participate in government tenders and supporting our return to the shipbuilding sector,” said Miro Arantes Filho, CEO of Mauá Shipyard.
Recent movements involving AHTS vessels serving Brava Energia are linked to separate docking and replacement arrangements within the company’s offshore support fleet.
One Energy News understands that Navvik Topper was mobilized to cover Bushbuck while the Bram Offshore vessel underwent docking and corrective maintenance.
With Normand Turmalina now entering scheduled dry docking, Navvik Topper is also understood to be among the main options to provide temporary coverage during the maintenance period.
Bushbuck’s maintenance included corrective work on one of its main engines. The available information points to maintenance activity, not an operational incident.
Normand Turmalina remains under firm charter with Brava until early 2029 and is expected to return after completing its routine docking programme.
The duration of the latest substitution has not been disclosed.
OceanPact has signed an agreement to acquire Dock Brasil, a ship repair and docking yard located in São Gonçalo, Rio de Janeiro.
The transaction remains subject to corporate and legal steps, with completion expected by August 31. The value of the deal was not disclosed.
Dock Brasil said its operations, contracts and client service structure will remain unchanged. Carlos Boeckh, one of the company’s founders, will return as general director.
The move comes as OceanPact expands its position in Brazil’s offshore support market following its announced business combination with CBO.
If completed, the acquisition would give OceanPact direct exposure to docking and repair capacity during an active dry-docking cycle in Brazil’s offshore support fleet.
P-52 remains offline after gas-lift riser incident
Petrobras’ P-52 remains shut down at the Roncador field, nine months after a flammable gas leak led to an emergency shutdown. The ANP has not authorized its restart, and Petrobras has not established a return date. The unit was producing approximately 35,000 barrels per day before the shutdown.
P-33 begins voyage to Rio Grande for dismantling
Petrobras’ former P-33 production unit left Porto do Açu on July 23 for the Rio Grande shipyard, where it will be dismantled and recycled. The unit was sold in 2023 to Gerdau, in partnership with Ecovix, and had been moored at Açu since February 2024.
Normand Turmalina hauled out for maintenance
The Brazilian-flagged AHTS Normand Turmalina has been hauled out for maintenance and preservation work. The team involved in the manoeuvre described the vessel as weighing approximately 5,000 tonnes and identified Dock Brasil as responsible for the engineering works. The location and scope of the maintenance were not disclosed.
ANP approves review of marine fuel specifications
The ANP approved a 45-day public consultation and a public hearing on proposed revisions to Brazil’s specifications for marine diesel and marine fuel oil. The draft updates the regulations to international standards and introduces rules for renewable and synthetic marine fuels.
Consultation on Brazilian supplier preference closes
The ANP’s 60-day preliminary consultation on equal opportunity and preferential treatment for Brazilian suppliers in oil and gas procurement closed on July 24. The proposal covers procurement schedules, preference margins, supplier complaints, regulatory oversight and penalties.
We are pleased to provide an update on the current long-term tenders that are open to offer.
Open tenders:
What has changed?
Petrobras 1x UMS: Opportunity 7004613237 was concluded on July 21st, 2026.
What else is happening?
End of contract. A.H. Valletta and CBO Xavantes are expected to complete the Atlantic Star towing contract shortly. The buoys and anchors have been offloaded in Itajaí, while the mooring equipment has been offloaded in Niterói.
Run of bad luck. In less than six months, DOF has experienced the total loss of one vessel and an engine room fire aboard another (non-critical). It raises questions about what has been happening at the Norwegian company, traditionally recognized for its operational excellence.
The 19th edition of OneEnergy magazine, published by Westhon Media, features an exclusive interview with Rogério Ibrahim, CEO of Foresea. The issue also highlights Wärtsilä‘s presence in Brazil, along with profiles of Maria Ciriaco and Vanessa Costa, two of Westhon‘s key professionals.
