Tag: Constitutional insights

  • Constitutional Insights #3

    Constitutional Insights #3

    Oil, Natural Gas and Other Fluid Hydrocarbon Royalties
    under Brazilian Law

    By Luis Fernando Priolli

    The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) held hearings on May 6 and 7 regarding the Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality (ADIs) 4916, 4917, 4920, 4918, and 5038, respectively filed by the Governors of the States of Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, the Board of Directors of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Rio de Janeiro, and the Brazilian Association of Municipalities with Maritime, River, and Land Oil and Natural Gas Loading and Unloading Terminals (ABRAMT). The cases, reported by Justice Cármen Lúcia, challenge amendments introduced by the Royalties Law (Law No. 12,734/2012).

    Luis Fernando Priolli
    Luis Fernando Priolli (Source: Private Collection)

    This law seeks to amend Laws No. 9,478 of August 6, 1997, and No. 12,351 of December 22, 2010, in order to establish new rules for the distribution among the entities of the Federation (Federal Government, States, and Municipalities) of royalties and special participation fees arising from the exploration of oil, natural gas, and other fluid hydrocarbons (“Oil Royalties”), as well as to improve the regulatory framework governing the exploitation of these resources under the production-sharing regime.

    During the 1987–1988 Constitutional Assembly, the constituent legislators established that oil and its derivatives would be subject to a special ICMS tax regime. In other words, ICMS would not be collected in the producing state (at the origin), but rather in the destination state (where consumption occurs), contrary to the general taxation rule.

    Since this would clearly cause losses to producing states and municipalities, the 1988 Federal Constitution (“CF/88”) guaranteed financial compensation for exploratory activities to producing states and municipalities, municipalities affected by exploration activities, and municipalities adjacent to offshore production areas, as provided in Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, through Oil Royalties and special participation fees on oil and natural gas exploration.

    To properly understand the intended purpose of this so-called financial compensation, it is important to analyze the records and debates of the 1987–1988 National Constitutional Assembly, the prevailing interpretation of the STF and constitutional legal doctrine.

    Under the general ICMS interstate taxation rule, taxation normally benefits the state of origin. However, in the case of oil and its derivatives, the decision was made to tax consumption at destination (currently Article 155, Paragraph 2, Item X, “b” of the Constitution). This removed revenue from producing states. As a political and financial counterpart, the mechanism provided in Article 20, Paragraph 1 was created.

    In the judgment of Writ of Mandamus No. 24,312/DF before the STF, reported by Justice Ellen Gracie on December 19, 2003, Justice Nelson Jobim — who had also served as a constituent federal congressman and played a key technical and political role in drafting the final constitutional text — provided the following historical reconstruction of the negotiations held during the Constitutional Assembly, describing the political agreement concerning ICMS and royalties:

    “There was extensive discussion during the Constitutional Assembly as to whether ICMS should be levied at origin or destination. An issue arose involving electricity and oil. Oil-producing and electricity-producing states intended to maintain ICMS collection at origin. São Paulo, naturally, preferred destination taxation because it is a consumer state. The political solution was as follows: ICMS collection was removed from the origin state and financial compensation was created for producing states. That is how Paragraph 1 of Article 20 of the Constitution came into existence.”

    In another portion of the same debate, Jobim added:

    “It was established that ICMS would not apply to operations involving oil, including lubricants, liquid and gaseous fuels derived therefrom, and electricity destined for other states. In other words, ICMS incidence was removed from origin. Thus, the following solution was adopted: ICMS was removed from origin and states were granted financial compensation for the loss of such revenue.”

    And further:

    “I am attempting to reconstruct the historical issue of the Constitutional Assembly. This is not federal revenue that the Union is generously transferring to the states; rather, it is revenue originally belonging to the states, as financial compensation for the exploitation within their territories of an asset not subject to ICMS.”

    Nelson Jobim
    Nelson Jobim (Source: Elza Fiuza/Agência Brasil)

    The principal purpose of this constitutional provision was therefore to compensate producing states for the loss of tax revenues caused by destination-based ICMS taxation on oil. However, because the constitutional text also incorporated the idea of “compensation for the impacts and risks of exploration,” it opened the possibility of including environmental, infrastructure, and socioeconomic impacts and risks within its scope.

    Thanks to the expression “financial compensation,” it also became legally acceptable to associate royalties with (a) territorial degradation; (b) environmental risks; (c) pressure on public services; and (d) the finite nature of natural resources.

    Although the STF did not establish a binding precedent in this judgment stating that royalties exist exclusively to compensate for ICMS revenue losses, the Court formally recognized in MS 24.312 that royalties have the constitutional nature of “participation” or “financial compensation,” and that they originally belong to the beneficiary states and municipalities.

    STF
    STF (Source: Gustavo Moreno/STF)

    The summary of the judgment itself also references another rationale based on compensation for the economic, social, and environmental damages resulting from oil exploration activities.

    Historically, therefore, the issue may be summarized as follows:

    1. During the 1988 Constitutional Assembly
      1. The predominant political purpose was to compensate for the loss of ICMS revenue at origin;
      1. Especially for Rio de Janeiro and other producing states.

    The constituent debates consolidated the political solution later reflected in:

    • Article 155, Paragraph 2, Item X, “b”
      • ICMS on oil and electricity would be levied at destination; and
    • Article 20, Paragraph 1
      • Financial compensation/participation for resource exploitation.

    It is precisely because of this connection that Justice Jobim stated that “Article 20, Paragraph 1 must be read together with Item X of Article 155.”

    • In subsequent legal developments
      • The thesis of compensation for the environmental, economic, and social impacts of exploration activities also became consolidated.
    • Therefore, royalties today have a dual foundation
      • A federal-taxation rationale; and
      • An environmental/economic compensatory rationale.

    This point became especially important in later disputes concerning the redistribution of pre-salt oil royalties, when producing states argued that the Constitution had established a specific federal pact in exchange for the loss of ICMS revenues. This understanding supported Justice Cármen Lúcia’s vote declaring unconstitutional the law that altered the rules governing the distribution of oil royalties, on the grounds that Law No. 12,734/2012 went beyond a mere revision of percentages and ultimately disrupted the federal balance by changing which entities are entitled to the financial compensation provided for in the Constitution.

    Cármen Lúcia
    Cármen Lúcia (Source: Antonio Augusto/STF)
  • Constitutional Insights #2

    Constitutional Insights #2

    Water: Commodity or Common Good?

    By Luis Fernando Priolli

    In the early hours of February 28, the United States and Israel launched a military offensive against Iranian targets, including key leadership figures, prompting an immediate response from Iran.

    Since the Islamic Revolution (1979), there has been intense rivalry between Israel and Iran; however, an open war such as the one currently unfolding is unprecedented and may, as the conflict develops, lead to the involvement of other countries, potentially escalating into a global-scale war.

    Every war brings significant and long-lasting impacts, regardless of its scale or underlying motives. Armed conflicts result in: (i) loss of life (both military personnel and civilians), long-term psychological trauma, mass displacement, and refugee crises; (ii) destruction of urban infrastructure, including housing, schools, hospitals, industrial facilities, transportation networks, and other essential structures; and (iii) social and economic crises, leading to increased inflation, poverty, social instability, and widespread human rights violations.

    Even in times of war, however, certain rules must be observed. These rules are collectively referred to as the Law of War (International Humanitarian Law), which comprises international norms primarily based on the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. It’s purpose is to prohibit certain acts and methods of warfare, limit hostilities, and ensure the protection of civilians, the wounded, and prisoners of war. These rules also prohibit attacks against, destruction of, or damage to infrastructure indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, including drinking water facilities and irrigation systems.

    Article 54(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states:

                “It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.”

    Nevertheless, last week Iran and Bahrain reported attacks on desalination infrastructure — facilities essential for water supply — creating a serious risk to regional water security and raising concerns about the use of water as a “weapon of war.”

    The desalination plant on Qeshm Island in Iran, which supplies several Iranian villages, as well as another desalination facility in Bahrain, were reportedly damaged. These installations are crucial for water provision, representing a serious escalation with potential risks to civilian survival.

    Such attacks inevitably place this resource at the center of governmental concern, as the United Nations (UN) considers water a strategic natural resource, essential for life, economic stability, and global security—not merely a commercial commodity.

    Recently, the UN warned that the world has entered an era of “global water bankruptcy,” caused by human activities that have altered the water cycle and compromised the reliability of water availability. Currently, around 4 billion people experience severe water scarcity for at least one month each year. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that this scarcity could affect up to two-thirds of the world’s population by 2050.

    In response, the UN General Assembly declared in 2010 that clean and safe drinking water and sanitation are essential human rights, emphasizing that water is a common good rather than a commodity, and warning against its financialization or treatment as a mere market product. Nevertheless, due to increasing scarcity, water is also treated as a commodity and traded in financial markets, generating debates about equitable access.

    In Brazil, Law No. 9,433/1997 defines water as a public resource with economic value, but establishes that its priority use is human consumption, in line with the UN’s understanding that water should not be managed solely through a market-oriented approach, but rather prioritized as a resource essential to life.

    Despite this framework, water has been priced in financial markets, with water futures contracts traded on the New York Stock Exchange since 2020, allowing financial speculation regarding its future value. This reflects the fact that water is fundamentally a limited natural resource whose price is influenced by climate variability, demand, and energy production.

    Water is therefore treated as a commodity in financial markets, particularly due to its scarcity—only about 1% of the planet’s water is potable—which increases its economic value and attracts financial investment. However, there remains significant tension between the perspective of water as a human right (implying universal access) and its comodityfication, which may hinder access for vulnerable populations. While international institutions emphasize water as a common good and a heritage of humanity, financial markets tend to treat it as a scarce economic asset.

    Whether in Brazil or globally, it is essential that public policies governing water management and use be effective, coordinated, and sustainable. Water scarcity is not merely a natural phenomenon but also a consequence of mismanagement, river pollution, and deforestation.

    Addressing these challenges is crucial to achieving United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6, which aims to ensure access to safe water and sanitation for all by 2030. This requires coordinated public policies among different levels of government—federal, state, and municipal—to avoid overlapping or ineffective actions, adopting the river basin as the primary planning unit and protecting forests and water resources in order to mitigate droughts and floods.

  • Constitutional Insights #1

    Constitutional Insights #1

    Congress must provide constitutional regulation for the gas sector

    By Luis Fernando Priolli

    Luis Fernando Priolli (Source: Private Collection)

    Brazil is at a crucial turning point in defining the rules for the natural gas sector. The National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Biofuels (ANP) is currently debating a resolution to establish technical criteria differentiating transmission pipelines from distribution pipelines. While seemingly technical, this discussion directly impacts sector organization, legal certainty for investments, and the future of the national energy matrix.

    Natural gas is a strategic transition fuel. It emits fewer pollutants than coal and oil derivatives and offers the flexibility to meet demand peaks and complement renewable sources like solar and wind. Its role is increasingly vital for the stability of the Brazilian electrical system, especially regarding climate change and international pressure for decarbonization.

    ANP’s proposal seeks to harmonize rules and bring regulatory clarity, but it does not resolve the root problem. Although it aims to align regulation with the Gas Law (Law No. 14,134/2021), the discussion highlights a larger void: the lack of regulation for Article 25, §2º of the Federal Constitution.

    This constitutional provision, amended in 1995, determines that States are responsible for exploring local piped gas services, either directly or through concessions. The amendment sought to grant States autonomy but failed to define precise competencies, creating persistent ambiguities.

    The bottom line is that the 1995 constitutional amendment made the issue more confusing. By including the phrase “in accordance with the law,” the amendment delegated regulation to federal legislation that still does not exist.

    For exactly three decades, Congress has failed to create this legislation. In this vacuum, state governments created their own laws and regulatory agencies established their own norms. These are merely palliative measures; without a federal law—the only definitive solution—legal insecurity persists, leading to constant judicial challenges against state laws and agency norms.

    The lack of regulation generates insecurity on several fronts:

    • Divergent Interpretations: Some argue States have exclusive competence; others believe federal limits are necessary to avoid conflict with the Union.
    • Stalled Infrastructure: Multi-billion real projects are exposed to legal risks. Transporters fear investing in pipelines that might be reclassified as state distribution.
    • Increased Costs: Legal disputes stall contracts, make projects more expensive, and delay essential works for the expansion of the gas network.

    An administrative resolution from the ANP is insufficient to pacify the sector. The true solution lies with the National Congress. Only the regulation of Article 25, §2º can unequivocally define the boundaries between Federal and State jurisdiction. This complementary law is what will provide legal certainty and align Brazil with international best practices.

    This is not a merely technical debate; it involves significant economic interests for producers, transporters, distributors, and industrial consumers (steel, chemical, and fertilizer sectors). For natural gas to increase national competitiveness, the regulatory framework must be stable and predictable.

    Brazil currently faces a contradiction: it recognizes the strategic importance of gas while maintaining a 30-year regulatory impasse. This gap threatens energy security and drives away investment. The time to fill this constitutional void is now. Regulating the Constitution is an indispensable condition for the sustainable expansion of the natural gas market and the future of Brazilian energy policy.