Our newsroom has received an audio recording reportedly from the bridge of the Skandi Logger, broadcasting a Mayday distress call and an order to abandon ship near the P-37 platform in the Marlim field. The vessel’s position has been confirmed.
Sources at the scene report that the vessel is already receiving assistance and connected for towing. The situation appears to be under control. At this stage, there is no confirmed information of any injuries or casualties.
In contact with our team, DOF said:
“DOF reports that, in the early hours of Wednesday (22), the Skandi Logger experienced an electrical short circuit, with no open flame, in its main switchboard while operating alongside the P-37 platform in Brazil’s Campos Basin.
The company responded immediately to the incident and is providing full support to the onboard crew, while also coordinating and planning the operation to release the vessel from the field and carry out the necessary repairs.
No injuries were reported among those on board, and, at this time, no environmental impact has been identified.
The vessel remains under control, and DOF continues to monitor the situation while taking all necessary measures to ensure the safety of personnel, the environment, and the operation”
We are seeking further details from Brazilian Navy and will provide updates as information becomes available.
UPDATE, July 22: The barge FLU IPÊ was removed from the Icaraí breakwater in Caucaia, Ceará, on Wednesday morning at approximately 9:00 a.m., concluding a refloating operation that lasted nearly 28 hours. Sulnorte Serviços Marítimos, the company responsible for the operation, said the work was conducted in accordance with the plan approved by the Ceará Port Captaincy, with no environmental impact and no injuries reported among crew, company personnel or local residents.
FLU IPÊ barge remains grounded on Ceará coast after tow separation
The barge FLU IPÊ remained grounded at the Icaraí breakwater in Caucaia, Ceará, on Tuesday evening after separating from its towing system during an offshore tow.
The operation was being conducted by the tug SN Caraíva. Sulnorte, the company responsible for the tow, said the barge drifted after the separation and subsequently grounded at the breakwater.
The cause of the incident has not yet been established. Reports that the towing line broke have not been confirmed by either Sulnorte or the Brazilian Navy.
The barge was empty and uncrewed at the time of the incident. No injuries, oil spill or environmental damage were reported.
The Ceará Port Captaincy inspected the site and will open an Administrative Inquiry into Navigation Accidents and Facts to determine the causes, circumstances and responsibilities. The initial deadline for completion is 90 days.
Sulnorte said technical and operational teams were mobilized to monitor the barge and prepare its removal, subject to tide, weather and safety conditions. Despite preparations to begin the operation on Tuesday, FLU IPÊ remained grounded at the latest update [see update above].
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WSB is pleased to provide an update on the current long-term tenders that are open to offer.
Open tenders:
What has changed?
Petrobras 2x AHTS newbuilding: Opportunity 7004345558 new deadline August 21st, 2026;
Petrobras FPSO for Albacora Rev: Opportunity 7004415516 new deadline August 10th, 2026.
What else is happening?
Birthday Cake!Atlantic Star has completed its Karoon contract and is now at Mauá Shipyard mobilizing for a decommissioning project starting in about 12 months.
Will it be cancelled? After four previous extensions, the bid for the construction of two new AHTSs has been extended once again. Is it due to a lack of bidders? A shortage of shipyards capable of delivering the project? Or are local yards still unable to meet the local content requirements set out in the tender? More info w/ WSB.
More SOVs in sight: REM Wind is preparing to commence its accommodation support contract with Petrobras.
Petrobras extends AHTS tender deadline to August 21Petrobras has extended the submission deadline for its newbuild AHTS tender, with bids now due on August 21. This is the fourth postponement since late May.
Petrobras has not disclosed the reason for the latest extension. Several shipowners have requested additional time to meet the financing documentation required under Addendum K, with the bank Comfort Letter once again at the center of the issue. Petrobras considered the requests but is not expected to remove the requirement.
After such a prolonged process and repeated extensions, the possibility of cancellation can no longer be ignored, although Petrobras has given no indication that this is currently under consideration.
At this point, the focus is no longer on the deadline itself. What happens when bidding closes will say far more about the market than another extension ever could.
The dispute surrounding Capital Marítima has exposed a question that reaches far beyond one company: whether Brazil’s maritime policy is preserving not only vessels and jobs, but also the entrepreneurs, intellectual capital and industrial capability required to sustain a genuinely national shipping industry
For generations, Brazilian shipping was shaped by companies closely identified with their founders: Wilson Sons; CBO under the Fischer family; São Miguel and Bravante under Marcelino and Renato Nascimento following their father; Comte Matos and William, Astromaritima; Camorim; and, more recently, OceanPact and Posidonia. Despite different histories and business models, they accumulated something more important than vessels alone: Brazilian entrepreneurial, technical and institutional capital.
Operating in Brazil required knowledge of Petrobras and international oil companies, shipyards, banks, ANTAQ, the Navy, unions, crews and repeated market cycles. Mobilisation failures, vessel downtime, financial crises and regulatory changes produced experience that remained within the country. This intangible capital, commercial credibility, engineering judgement, institutional memory and operational discipline, is difficult to value, but it is what distinguishes an established shipowner from a newly incorporated vehicle that merely controls a fleet.
Camorim shipyard, at Niterói (RJ) (Source: Camorim)
Over the past two decades, the Brazilian market has changed, drastically. International investors, foreign shipping groups and private equity have expanded, while Brazilian operators have increasingly been acquired or integrated into structures spanning several jurisdictions. More sophisticated financing and ownership arrangements are not inherently negative. Shipping depends on global capital, technology and expertise, and Brazil should continue to welcome international organized and transparent participation.
The strategic question is whether the country is also preserving its capacity to create and strengthen Brazilian shipowners, and reserving due care to investigating the foreign entities involved. A nation can finance vessels, generate contracts and maintain employment while gradually transferring decision-making, intellectual property, commercial relationships and accumulated expertise abroad. Ships may continue to fly the Brazilian flag even as the industry’s economic and intellectual substance migrates elsewhere.
Capital Marítima offers a visible example of this broader issue, not because foreign ownership necessarily causes poor governance, but because the dispute has shown how uncertainty over control, authority, assets and responsibility can quickly affect employees, clients, suppliers, vessels and commercial relationships built over years.
A dispute that escaped the boardroom
Capital Marítima developed from Embrareb, a Brazilian company associated with entrepreneur Plínio Calenzo, and later came to include Constance Maritime, incorporated in Monrovia, Liberia, alongside interests commercially associated with the Capital Offshore name. What might ordinarily have remained a dispute over shares, management and corporate authority soon reached the company’s workforce, commercial counterparties and vessel operations.
Negotiations with shore-based employees have progressed since One Energy first reported on the dispute, and some workers indicated their willingness to accept a settlement proposed by the company. At the time of publication, however, the agreements had not yet been formally executed by the administration. The immediate tensions may have eased, but the company’s institutional position remains unsettled. Further, the technical challenges surrounding the ACE Defender with Petrobras and the Brazilian Navy have come to a halt.
The situation became more serious in labour proceedings involving the ACE Defender, when the court ordered the arrest of the vessel after considering the risk that a future judgment might be difficult to enforce, particularly in light of the assets available in Brazil and the opacity attributed to the corporate structure supporting the operation. Petrobras, as the recipient of the vessel’s services, was also instructed to make a judicial deposit up to the value claimed.
The arrest does not constitute a final finding of liability. It does, however, reveal a practical concern: when a vessel operates in Brazil but ownership, management, employment, financing, guarantees and material assets are distributed abroad, the reach of Brazilian jurisdiction may be less secure than the obligations created within the country. The same weakness that may prevent an employee from recovering a legitimate indemnity can affect suppliers, creditors and commercial partners attempting to enforce guarantees or contractual rights against foreign group assets.
The corporate dispute has also entered arbitration. After being informed that an emergency arbitrator had been appointed, the 7th Corporate Court of Rio de Janeiro suspended an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting intended to consider claims against shareholders and administrators. The judge concluded that prudence required avoiding further escalation until the appropriate arbitral forum had been established and prospectively set aside the effects of any resolution adopted in breach of the order, which was followed by the arbitrator.
The decision neither settles the control dispute nor invalidates every act of the administration currently in place. It confirms, however, that the company’s governance remains contested and subject to interim measures while arbitration proceeds.
The sequence bears some of the characteristics of an aggressive takeover: provisional authority is obtained, operational and commercial channels are occupied rapidly, and practical consequences emerge well before the legal dispute can be finally resolved. Whether this was a deliberate strategy in the Capital case is for the courts and the arbitral tribunal to determine. What is already evident is that those assuming control appear not to have anticipated the commercial damage caused by acting before authority, representation and stakeholder relationships had been stabilized.
A more experienced maritime transition would ordinarily seek to preserve continuity while the shareholder dispute proceeded in parallel. Instead, relationships and opportunities developed over years were exposed to immediate disruption. One Energy has confirmed that a major international client requested documentary confirmation of the authority of Capital Marítima’s current controllers on an ongoing competitive process. The required confirmation was not produced within the requested timeframe, and negotiations involving offers that had already reached the award stage were terminated.
That episode shows how quickly provisional corporate power can destroy permanent commercial value. Often clients cannot wait for arbitration. They must secure tonnage, preserve schedules and manage risk, and they will usually move to another option when representation or vessel availability cannot be confirmed.
What Brazil loses when it loses a shipowner
The significance of the Capital case extends beyond the dispute itself. It brings into view the internationalisation not only of capital and control, but also of industrial knowledge, commercial intelligence and entrepreneurial capability.
Brazilian maritime policy has historically concentrated on tangible assets: domestic construction, Brazilian-flag tonnage, REB registration, local content and financing through the Merchant Marine Fund. These instruments remain important, but ships alone do not create shipowners.
ANTAQ headquarter (Source: Courtesy)
A maritime company depends on accumulated capital, access to charterers, regulatory knowledge, engineering capability, financial expertise, experienced management and the ability to survive long periods of weak markets. This capability resides in people, systems, relationships and judgement, and it takes years to develop.
Every contract performed in Brazil produces knowledge. Vessel data is collected, maintenance systems are refined, crews gain experience, engineering solutions are developed and commercial teams learn how particular clients assess risk. The strategic question is who retains and monetises that knowledge.
When a Brazilian operator is absorbed into an international group, its legal entity may remain in the country while procurement, engineering, financial strategy, operational data and client relationships become centralised abroad. Brazilian workers continue to perform the activity, but the higher-value capability created by their experience may no longer accumulate within a Brazilian enterprise.
This transformation is rarely dramatic. It occurs through acquisitions, management agreements and the gradual migration of strategic functions. The country continues to host vessels and crews while losing the capacity to create companies that control technology, capital and international expansion. Losing a shipowner can therefore mean losing an ecosystem of knowledge assembled over an entire generation.
The unequal cost of building a shipowner
The imbalance becomes clearer when the conditions faced by Brazilian entrepreneurs are compared with those available to international competitors. Local companies operate with expensive capital, volatile exchange rates, complex taxation, demanding collateral requirements and recurrent regulatory and judicial uncertainty. Offshore assets require substantial investment, while the revenue supporting them depends on contracts that may be delayed, contested or terminated.
International groups often enter Brazil with access to deeper capital markets, export-credit agencies, established banking relationships and fleets capable of spreading risk across several regions. They may use cash flow generated elsewhere to acquire Brazilian companies or assets precisely when local operators are financially vulnerable.
Competition therefore takes place not only between companies, but between national industrial ecosystems.
When a foreign group acquires a Brazilian operator, it may gain approved-vendor status, licences, local registrations, trained personnel, regulatory knowledge and access to commercial relationships developed over many years, notwithstanding the extremely competitive financing mechanisms available – while they can present foreign guarantees. The Brazilian entrepreneur often created these assets under far less favourable financial conditions.
The result is unlikely to be the disappearance of maritime activity from Brazil. The market is too attractive. The quieter consequence is that Brazilian entrepreneurs may increasingly become minority partners, local representatives or service providers within structures financed and controlled elsewhere. Brazil preserves the operations while losing more of their economic ownership.
That outcome should not be blamed on foreign investors, who are acting,most of the time, rationally. It is principally a policy question. Other countries support the international expansion of their maritime companies through finance, guarantees, taxation and coordinated industrial policies. The absence of comparable support in Brazil is itself a choice, and it generally favours those arriving with the strongest backing.
Partnership requires substance
Brazil does not need to choose between domestic entrepreneurship and foreign investment. It needs partnerships that strengthen both. International groups can bring scale, technology, financial discipline and improved operating standards, but the local side should not be reduced to providing licences, market access and execution while the strategic value is accumulated elsewhere.
A country should defend its own entrepreneurs in partnership with the world; it should not merely defend the world’s entrepreneurs through partnerships with its own.
This does not justify protecting inefficient companies simply because they are Brazilian. Public support should require transparency, sound governance, safety, investment and the creation of lasting domestic capability. Nor should foreign-controlled groups be presumed less committed to Brazil, unless they really are. The relevant distinction is not nationality alone, but economic substance, accountability and contribution to the local industrial base.
Brazil should aim not only to host international shipowners, but also to create Brazilian companies capable of becoming international shipowners themselves.
Financing companies, not only ships
Starnav is a Brazilian shipping company (EBN) owned by the Chilean Detroit Group (Source: Starnav/Courtesy)
For decades, Brazilian maritime policy treated the construction and financing of vessels as its central challenge. The logic was reasonable: domestic orders would create employment, engineering capability and an industrial supply chain. But financing a vessel does not necessarily create a sustainable shipowner. Maybe it better benefits an existing and capitalized one, and not local.
The company must also possess working capital, commercial strength, governance and the balance sheet required to absorb delays, cost overruns, technical failures and periods without revenue. A vessel depreciates; a successful shipowner can accumulate value through credibility, systems, knowledge and access to progressively better financing.
The most valuable outcome of public support should therefore be an enterprise capable of ordering its next vessel with less dependence on the same support. Brazil should measure not only how many ships were delivered, but how many stronger, more transparent and internationally competitive companies were created. And to start, they must created from zero.
That requires policy instruments directed at the enterprise itself: competitive capital, guarantees, governance standards, technology, data, management development and support for international expansion. Shipbuilding and entrepreneurial formation should be parts of the same strategy.
What should count as a Brazilian shipping company?
The transformation of the sector also raises a regulatory question. The current definition of a Brazilian Shipping Company places considerable weight on incorporation, authorisation, flag, registration and tonnage. Those criteria remain relevant, but they may no longer be sufficient measures of national economic substance.
A company may be incorporated in Brazil, employ Brazilian crews and operate Brazilian-flagged vessels while its decision-making, guarantees, intellectual property and strategic assets remain abroad. Another may receive foreign capital while retaining management, technical capability, assets and reinvestment substantially in Brazil. Formally similar companies may therefore contribute very differently to national development and present different levels of accountability before Brazilian jurisdiction.
A modern framework should not rely on crude ownership restrictions. It could instead consider transparency of ultimate ownership and everything in-between, the location of effective management, the availability of assets and guarantees in Brazil, the authority of local administration, reinvestment, professional training, research and development, and the participation of Brazilian entrepreneurs in economic decision-making.
The purpose would not be to exclude internationally controlled companies, but to align access to public support, strategic protections and preferential financing with verifiable economic substance.
Capital Marítima does not answer this debate, and its dispute should not be used to generalise about every foreign-linked operator. It does, however, show how quickly uncertainty over place, control, authority and assets can affect workers, courts, clients and commercial partners, and how an aggressive transition under provisional authority can destroy value before the underlying legal dispute reaches a final outcome.
More than a maritime market
Brazil must decide what it expects from maritime policy. If the objective is merely to ensure the availability of vessels, international capital can provide them whenever demand and contract terms justify the investment. Sort of what is happening now with larger demand and the ageing fleet. If the country also wants to preserve national industrial capability, its policies must support companies that retain technical knowledge, financial substance, commercial intelligence and effective decision-making in Brazil.
This does not require protectionism. It requires incentives and standards that distinguish between structures that merely use Brazilian registrations, contracts and flag arrangements and those that build durable companies, skills and accountability within the country.
The Capital Marítima case does not resolve this question, but it illustrates the cost of ignoring it. When control, assets, guarantees and authority are distributed across jurisdictions, a shareholder dispute can quickly affect vessels, employees, clients, suppliers and contracts. Formal Brazilian status alone does not ensure operational continuity or effective accountability.
Brazilian policy has spent decades addressing how ships should be financed. Its next challenge is to create competitive shipowners capable of attracting international capital, retaining industrial knowledge, answering effectively to Brazilian jurisdiction and expanding beyond the domestic market. That is the practical distinction between remaining a maritime industry and becoming merely a maritime market.
Editor’s note: One Energy has sought comments and documentary clarification from Capital Marítima, Constance Maritime and representatives associated with the administration currently in place. The publication remains open to further documents, clarification and the exercise of the right of reply. Interim court orders, labour claims and arbitral proceedings do not constitute final findings of liability, and all persons and companies mentioned remain entitled to due process and a full opportunity to present their position.
CMM Offshore has announced the start of operations of the FOSRV CMM Velocity under a four-year Petrobras charter, marking the vessel’s return to service following the agreement announced earlier this year.
The CMM Velocity is a Fast Oil Spill Response Vessel dedicated to environmental emergency response and oil spill prevention, supporting Petrobras’ offshore contingency strategy.
The operation will also incorporate drone-based monitoring to strengthen environmental response capabilities, adding another layer of surveillance and operational support to the vessel’s scope.
With the vessel now back in operation, Petrobras expands the availability of dedicated oil spill response assets supporting its offshore activities
Built for high-complexity campaigns and multipurpose support, the high-spec Mexican asset faces its most turbulent period yet, far from the offshore fields she was expected to serve and under judicial custody in Guanabara Bay.
The Vessel
The MPSV Lagunero (IMO 9761736) was delivered in 2018 as one of the modern centerpieces of the Mexican offshore support market. Designed as a high-spec Multipurpose Support Vessel, the 85-meter asset combines offshore support capability with accommodation for up to 197 personnel.
Powered by a diesel-electric propulsion system and equipped with DP2, a 100-ton main crane and accommodation for up to 197 personnel, the vessel was designed for complex offshore campaigns, including floatel operations.
The route to Brazil and the labor crisis
Flying the Mexican flag and managed by the Marinsa group, the vessel crossed the Atlantic intending to support Petrobras’ offshore operations as a floatel. However, the expected campaign never materialized, and the vessel soon became the centre of one of Brazil’s most significant labour and judicial disputes involving an offshore support vessel.
In April 2026, an inspection carried out by Brazil’s Labor Inspection Secretariat revealed that the crew, mostly composed of Mexican nationals, was facing a critical situation of abandonment. The crew had gone more than 90 days without receiving salaries while operating under severe shortages of fuel, food and other essential onboard supplies.
The institutional response was swift. The Regional Labor Prosecutor’s Office of Rio de Janeiro (MPT-RJ) filed an urgent Public Civil Action against Marinsa de México, its Brazilian subsidiary, local partner entities and the international P&I insurer British Marine.
In May 2026, the 23rd Labor Court of Rio de Janeiro issued an injunction ordering the payment of approximately BRL 3.07 million in outstanding wages, alongside the immediate supply of fuel and provisions and the assisted repatriation of the affected crew members.
Today, Lagunero remains moored at Renave Shipyard in Niterói (RJ), where she continues under judicial arrest. Public AIS records continue to place the vessel at the shipyard, with no indication that she has returned to commercial service.
Next thursday, another vessel. Another story. Another chapter of Por Onde Anda?
The semi-submersible Atlantic Star arrived in Guanabara Bay today under tow by the AHTSs Valletta and Xavantes and is expected to berth at Estaleiro Mauá S/A following the completion of its workover campaign for Karoon Energy at the Baúna field.
The timing is significant.
Constellation’s contract with Karoon covered a one-well heavy workover campaign, while Karoon has since confirmed that the intervention on the SPS-92 well was successfully completed, restoring production to approximately 8,600 barrels of oil per day. The Atlantic Star’s arrival at Mauá comes immediately after the conclusion of that campaign, marking the end of its latest operational assignment.
The market is already watching Trident Energy as a possible next destination for the Atlantic Star. While no public contract award has been announced, Constellation Oil Services’s latest investor presentation places two developments side by side: the completion of the Karoon campaign and an open demand from Trident Energy for an anchor-moored drilling unit with start-up expected in 2027. Although the company does not explicitly connect the two, the sequence has naturally attracted the market’s attention.
The movement is public. The context is on WSB.One. Contact us for full access.
Another take-or-pay agreement puts Brazil’s offshore logistics in the spotlight
On July 7, WSB Advisors analyzed the first take-or-pay agreement between Vast Infraestrutura and Petrobras, highlighting the role of long-term contractual structures in Brazil’s crude oil export logistics.
Less than two weeks later, Vast announced the renewal of its take-or-pay agreement with PETRONAS Brasil until the end of 2027.
The two agreements involve different operators, but the same logistics infrastructure and the same contractual model.
Take-or-pay agreements guarantee payment for a minimum contracted capacity regardless of actual throughput. For terminal operators, they provide greater revenue predictability. For oil companies, they secure long-term access to export infrastructure while improving operational planning.
On its own, the PETRONAS renewal is a straightforward commercial announcement. Alongside the agreement signed with Petrobras earlier this month, however, it adds another example of the same contractual model being adopted at the T-Oil terminal.
The two agreements involve different operators but share the same logistics infrastructure and the same commercial structure. Together, they place two separate long-term commitments side by side at a terminal that plays a central role in Brazil’s crude oil export chain.
In a period marked by the expansion of offshore activity in Brazil, driven by pre-salt developments, new oil discoveries, and growing discussions surrounding the Equatorial Margin, the drilling segment has once again moved to the forefront of the oil and gas industry. Despite its strategic importance to the offshore chain, drilling remains a topic that is rarely explored in depth within industry discussions. A gap that One.Energy magazine aims to address in this edition of Energy Talks. For the first time, the interview series dedicates an extensive and exclusive conversation to the drilling market in Brazil, covering operational challenges, technological innovation, competitiveness, safety, ESG, and market outlook.
To open this discussion, we spoke with Rogério Ibrahim, CEO of Foresea, one of the leading references in offshore drilling in Brazil. Since the company’s foundation, Ibrahim has led a business that has distinguished itself through operational excellence, the development of pioneering technologies, and the continuous utilization of its entire fleet in a highly competitive market shaped by major international players.
During the interview, the executive discusses groundbreaking projects developed by Foresea, including innovative solutions designed to enable the safe operation of drillships in shallow-water environments. He also addresses the impacts of the current geopolitical landscape on the industry, analyzes the momentum of Brazil’s oil and gas sector, and comments on the challenges of developing new talent for the drilling market. Ibrahim further shares his views on leadership, innovation, and Foresea’s long-term vision, offering a comprehensive perspective on one of the most strategic segments of Brazil’s offshore industry.
Rogério Ibrahim, Foresea’s CEO (Source: Bruno de Lima/Foresea)
The name “Foresea” combines the concepts of forecasting and the sea. With that in mind, how does this ability to anticipate translate into the company’s strategy?
The name Foresea was intentionally created to combine the idea of forecasting with the sea, reinforcing our ability to anticipate scenarios and adapt in order to deliver the best solutions in the maritime environment. That capability is built, first and foremost, on knowledge. Foresea has teams with more than thirty years of experience in the sector, and that experience translates into accumulated expertise and analytical capability. We are a company focused on solving our clients’ demands through innovation and operational excellence. This is reflected in our knowledge base, our ability to project scenarios, and our capacity to strategically plan our operations.
Still on the topic of competitive scenarios, at the end of last year Foresea announced the development of a new technology that enables deepwater drillships to safely operate in shallow-water wells, with water depths below 400 meters. Could you elaborate on this project and its current stage?
This project is one of several pioneering initiatives developed by our Innovation department. To explain this technology, it is important to first mention an earlier development — the anchored BOP solution, which was pioneered on our semi-submersible rig Norbe VI. This solution combines the BOP anchoring system — the Blowout Preventer being the safety equipment responsible for controlling well pressure — with real-time riser analysis.
This innovation allows dynamically positioned rigs, which are typically deployed in deepwater environments, to also operate in shallow-water wells without requiring anchoring on the seabed, enabling faster operations and reducing environmental impact on the ocean floor. The anchored BOP solution earned Petrobras an international award at OTC Brasil 2023.
Building on that development, Foresea created a new solution for our drillship Norbe VIII, once again combining an unprecedented set of technologies that enables a dynamically positioned drillship to remain connected to a shallow-water wellhead — in water depths below 400 meters — with a level of precision control and operational safety that currently does not exist anywhere else in the world. This technology is already being installed on the Norbe VIII, which is expected to be ready for shallow-water operations during the first half of 2026.
Norbe VIII (Source: Foresea)
Foresea has reportedly kept its entire fleet contracted since its foundation in 2023. What explains this performance?
Yes, we have maintained our entire fleet fully operational over the past years due to the quality of delivery we provide to our clients, always prioritizing safety and operational excellence. Foresea currently holds the best operational performance in the market. We closed 2025 with an average uptime close to 99%, winning Petrobras’ PEO-Sondas — the company’s Operational Excellence Program for drilling rigs — for the fourth consecutive time. This is the most important technical and management evaluation conducted by Petrobras. In addition, during OTC Brasil, we were recognized by Petrobras as the best offshore drilling operator.
Is the expansion of Foresea’s asset portfolio currently under consideration?
We are constantly monitoring the market and remain ready to evaluate any strategic business opportunities for the company. Expanding the size of our fleet is always part of our investment assessments. However, any investment decision must be accompanied by rigorous risk analysis and strong financial discipline, always with the objective of delivering returns to our shareholders without compromising our performance standards. We are not interested in growing simply for the sake of growth.
What supports the slogan “Foresea, market leader”? Which aspects characterize the company as such? And how was it possible to achieve these results in less than three years, in a market with strong international competition?
Rogério Ibrahim, Foresea’s CEO (Source: Bruno de Lima/Foresea)
There are several factors that place Foresea in a leadership position within Brazil’s offshore drilling segment. As mentioned, the company has maintained all of its rigs contracted while also expanding operations through the management of third-party rigs. Foresea is also recognized for operational efficiency, with the highest uptime levels in the market and the industry recognitions previously mentioned.
We are also leaders in innovation, introducing groundbreaking technologies to the sector. In addition, we have become a benchmark in sustainability through pioneering socio-environmental initiatives — such as the recycling and reuse of 100% of our waste and investments in improving the quality of public basic education in Macaé — which further reinforce our leadership position within the industry.
In recent months, the offshore industry has been impacted by several developments, including the approval of exploration activities in Brazil’s Equatorial Margin and new oil discoveries. At the same time, geopolitical tensions involving the United States, Iran, and Venezuela continue to affect global oil production and distribution. Do you believe these issues spilling in Foresea in any way?
The entire oil and gas industry closely monitors conflicts in the Middle East and evaluates their direct and indirect impacts on the domestic market. Brazilian oil is increasingly viewed as a secure and cost-competitive alternative. At the same time, we are living through a period of geopolitical uncertainty and elevated risks, which may increase insurance and maritime freight costs, in addition to creating inflationary pressure that affects overall operating expenses.
ESG has become an increasingly relevant topic. How does Foresea incorporate these practices into its strategy and operations?
I will begin with the “S”, the social pillar. Foresea maintains a strong commitment to people. This means ensuring high standards of safety, integrity, physical and mental health, well-being, training, and development for all employees, both onshore and offshore. It also means extending support to partners and local communities, such as Macaé, where we maintain our office and support local development projects.
The “E” (environmental), is embedded both in our day-to-day activities, including waste management and circular economy initiatives already mentioned, and in our research, development, and innovation efforts, which focus on incorporating technologies aimed at reducing emissions and other environmental impacts. I would also highlight that operational efficiency itself contributes to reducing environmental impact.
Finally, regarding governance, we follow strict compliance, integrity, and ethics policies across our business operations, supported by continuous monitoring processes. In addition, our fleet is internationally certified, ensuring quality standards and compliance with global regulations.
Safety is a central pillar in the industry, and Foresea has received several awards in this area. How does the company maintain such high standards in its operations?
Safety culture is embedded in Foresea’s DNA. This means maintaining a permanent and explicit commitment that goes far beyond operational controls and safety monitoring systems. We continuously invest in campaigns and training programs for both employees and contractors, always maintaining a strong focus on safety.
We promote training programs covering national and international regulatory standards, customized courses for accident prevention in critical operations, and safety management initiatives. One example is the use of Observation Cards, through which employees identify and report unsafe conditions or behaviors so corrective actions can be implemented.
More broadly, our Digital Sustainability Program enables the digital completion of health and safety checklists, while our Human Factors Program expands our strategic approach to safety management through a governance model that encourages continuous improvement and operational evolution. Altogether, these initiatives form a robust and highly structured framework that reinforces our safety culture.
Could you also discuss Foresea’s initiatives related to developing new talent? How do you see the market for professionals interested in drilling?
Foresea’s strategy for talent development is based on three pillars: mandatory training, educational incentives, and professional development programs.
Mandatory training is primarily aimed at offshore personnel working onboard drilling rigs and includes compliance with legal requirements and client-specific contractual demands. Educational incentives provide subsidies for employees to pursue language courses, undergraduate and postgraduate programs, and other professional development opportunities within the oil and gas industry.
Our development programs are designed to align company culture and prepare employees for new career challenges across all technical and professional levels. One example is our Offshore Development Program (PDO), which accelerates talent development through supervised offshore assignments for internal professionals and selected candidates from the external market.
We also maintain a Leadership Development Program focused on principles and values, safety and risk management, communication, compliance, and career development. In addition, we created the Drilling Academy to foster knowledge exchange and continuous technical development among teams directly involved in drilling operations.
Could you tell us a little about your professional trajectory before joining Foresea? You worked for major companies such as Odebrecht and Vale. Which lessons and experiences from that period still apply to your current role as CEO of Foresea?
Most of my professional experience has been concentrated in management and planning. I graduated in Civil Engineering from IME, the Military Institute of Engineering, in 1983, and shortly afterward completed a postgraduate degree in Business Administration at Coppead/UFRJ.
I then joined Vale, where I was responsible for Commercial Planning. Later, in 1998, I joined Odebrecht and worked across several areas, including Controllership, Treasury, Projects, and Corporate Finance. That experience gave me broad exposure and eventually led me to CFO positions at several group companies, including Odebrecht Engenharia & Construção, Santo Antônio Energia S.A., Odebrecht Energia, and later Ocyan. When Foresea was established, I assumed the company’s presidency.
I believe that this trajectory within major corporations across strategic sectors of the economy allowed me to develop highly relevant competencies, including financial restructuring, digital transformation, and high-performance team management, all of which contribute directly to my current role leading Foresea.
You have a background in Civil Engineering. How has this technical foundation contributed to your business vision and leadership style in such a complex sector as offshore?
I see Engineering as a discipline that naturally fosters leadership across different sectors because, beyond technical knowledge, it develops structured thinking focused on creating viable solutions for complex challenges.
Engineers are trained to maintain a systemic and strategic perspective, understanding how each part influences the overall result. This is extremely important for decision-making processes.
More specifically, civil engineering provides knowledge related to structures and materials, planning, logistics, cost management, and risk management, all of which are directly connected to offshore operations and business activities.
Rogério Ibrahim on a technical drillship inspection (Source: Bruno de Lima/Foresea)
Finally, what is your vision for Foresea over the next five to ten years?
Foresea has very positive long-term prospects for several reasons. First, we believe the Brazilian oil and gas market is currently one of the most attractive in the world. Brazil already represents more than 30% of global demand for offshore drilling contracts and is entering a new growth cycle.
We are confident that Foresea is prepared to play a leading role in this expansion. The investments we are making are aligned with that objective. Our priority is to maintain Foresea’s leadership position within the sector, fully prepared to capture market opportunities while sustaining high operational performance and environmental safety standards.
The shipment represents more than half of the steel required for the first four Handy-size tankers and supports the expansion of production at the Rio Grande Shipyard.
Every major project is defined by milestones that demonstrate its transition from planning to execution.
For the Transpetro fleet renewal programme, one of those milestones has now been reached with the arrival of approximately 11,000 tonnes of steel at the Ecovix-operated Rio Grande Shipyard, in southern Brazil.
The shipment represents more than 50% of all steel plates required for the construction of the first four Handy-size tanker hulls and provides the material base for the acceleration of production at the yard.
The four vessels are being constructed by the consortium formed by Ecovix and Mac Laren, with Ecovix leading the project and carrying out the principal construction activities at the Rio Grande Shipyard.
The arrival of the steel is particularly significant because it marks the beginning of a more intensive industrial phase. Construction will proceed in series, with the first hull entering production and the additional vessels being progressively incorporated into the production line.
The project is also well advanced beyond the procurement of steel. According to information available to WSB, the yard has already progressed with the acquisition of more than 90% of the equipment, materials and items required for the first four tankers.
Approximately 500 people are already directly employed at the Rio Grande Shipyard in connection with the project. This new production phase is expected to support the addition of a further 500 positions, bringing the total number of direct jobs to approximately 1,000.
The first four Handy-size tankers form part of a broader portfolio of 13 vessels already contracted for construction at the Rio Grande Shipyard, reinforcing the scale and long-term relevance of the industrial mobilisation now underway in Rio Grande.
Speaking to O Litorâneo during the steel delivery, Transpetro’s Maritime Transportation Director, Jones Soares, highlighted the importance of the projects for both Transpetro and Petrobras and expressed his personal confidence in their successful execution.
The arrival of 11,000 tonnes of steel is therefore more than a logistics event. It is a visible and measurable indication that the project is advancing into physical execution, supported by large-scale procurement, workforce mobilisation and the progressive reactivation of the shipbuilding supply chain.
11.000 toneladas de aço chegam à Ecovix enquanto o programa de navios-tanque da Transpetro entra em nova fase industrial
A remessa representa mais da metade do aço necessário para os quatro primeiros navios-tanque do tipo Handy-size e viabiliza a expansão da produção no Estaleiro Rio Grande.
Todo grande projeto é marcado por etapas fundamentais que demonstram sua transição do planejamento para a execução.
Para o programa de renovação da frota da Transpetro, um desses marcos foi alcançado com a chegada de aproximadamente 11.000 toneladas de aço ao Estaleiro Rio Grande, operado pela Ecovix, no sul do Brasil.
A carga representa mais de 50% de todas as chapas de aço necessárias para a construção dos cascos dos quatro primeiros navios-tanque Handy-size e fornece a base de materiais para acelerar a produção no estaleiro.
As quatro embarcações estão sendo construídas pelo consórcio formado pela Ecovix e pela Mac Laren, com a Ecovix liderando o projeto e executando as principais atividades de construção no Estaleiro Rio Grande.
A chegada do aço é particularmente significativa, pois marca o início de uma fase industrial mais intensa. A construção ocorrerá em série: o primeiro casco entrará em produção e as demais embarcações serão progressivamente incorporadas à linha de montagem.
O projeto também está avançado além da etapa de aquisição de aço. Segundo informações obtidas pelo WSB, o estaleiro já avançou na compra de mais de 90% dos equipamentos, materiais e itens necessários para os quatro primeiros navios-tanque.
Cerca de 500 pessoas já trabalham diretamente no projeto no Estaleiro Rio Grande. Espera-se que esta nova fase de produção permita a criação de mais 500 postos de trabalho, elevando o total de empregos diretos para aproximadamente 1.000.
Os quatro primeiros navios-tanque Handy-size integram um portfólio maior de 13 embarcações já contratadas para construção no Estaleiro Rio Grande, reforçando a escala e a relevância a longo prazo da mobilização industrial em curso na cidade.
Em entrevista ao jornal O Litorâneo durante a entrega do aço, o Diretor de Transporte Marítimo da Transpetro, Jones Soares, destacou a importância dos projetos tanto para a Transpetro quanto para a Petrobras e expressou sua confiança pessoal no sucesso da execução. A chegada de 11.000 toneladas de aço é, portanto, mais do que um evento logístico. É um indicador visível e mensurável de que o projeto está avançando para a execução física, apoiado por aquisições em larga escala, mobilização de mão de obra e a reativação progressiva da cadeia de suprimentos da indústria naval.
