Brava Energia has started a drilling campaign using Constellation’s Lone Star rig across the Papa-Terra and Atlanta fields.
The campaign includes four wells, with two located in Papa-Terra, in Campos Basin, and two in Atlanta, in Santos Basin, with completion expected by 1Q27.
The rig moved directly into the project after completing its previous contract in Brazil in January 2026, followed by a planned maintenance stop of just over 40 days, including hull cleaning and equipment overhauls.
Drilling activities will take place in Papa-Terra between March and September 2026, followed by well connection and first oil expected in 4Q26. The rig is scheduled to move to Atlanta in October, where operations will support first oil in 2Q27.
The campaign has been structured under an optimized capex allocation, with 65% directed to Atlanta and 35% to Papa-Terra, leveraging existing infrastructure to enhance production efficiency and reduce unit costs.
On March 26, WSB Advisors hosted its first happy hour of 2026 at the company’s rooftop in downtown Rio de Janeiro, gathering around 40 executives and professionals from the offshore sector.
The event brought together clients, partners and industry peers, with strong participation from shipowners, providing an opportunity to exchange views on current market dynamics in an informal setting. Since 2022, the WSB rooftop has served as a recurring meeting point for the offshore community.
“It was a memorable night. We dedicated this event to the shipowners, who turned out in force and filled our rooftop. As it was the first of the year, there was strong engagement, with participants actively exchanging valuable information and experiences,” said Pedro Pellegrini, Shipbroker and Naval Engineer at WSB Advisors.
WSB Advisors thanks all attendees for their presence and looks forward to the next gathering.
“Congratulations to the entire team for organizing the event. Everything was wonderful, with incredible energy, in a fantastic location, and excellent food and drinks. Every detail was thought out to make the guests feel comfortable.”, told Roberto D’Amato Leão, commercial manager at CLIAPORTO.
“It was a great moment. I think we can now say that 2026 has truly begun,” said Romulo Bacchiega, Head of Content & Sales at WSB Advisors, during his first participation in the company’s events.
Foresea has secured a long-term contract with Petrobras to operate the drillship ODN I offshore Brazil, adding about $465 million to its backlog. The agreement covers a 1,443-day campaign in the Mero Field, with operations expected to start in 2027 after the unit’s current contract ends.
The deal includes early termination and extension options. The award highlights strong demand for high-spec rigs in Brazil, where Petrobras continues expanding pre-salt developments to support production growth.
Petrobras announced a new discovery of high-quality oil in the pre-salt layer of the Campos Basin. The find was made in the Marlim Sul Field, at a well located 113 km off the coast of Campos dos Goytacazes.
The presence of oil was identified through electric logs and fluid samples. The material will undergo laboratory analysis to assess the area’s potential. The company said drilling was completed safely and with environmental care. Petrobras holds a 100% stake in the field.
A Federal Court in Angra dos Reis has ordered the suspension of the preliminary environmental license (LP) granted by IBAMA for the “Stage 4” development in the Santos Basin, following a request from the Federal Public Ministry (MPF).
The injunction is based on the alleged absence of prior consultation with traditional communities, including Indigenous groups, quilombolas and fishermen, as required under International Labour Organization Convention 169.
The court decision suspends the license until federal authorities present, within 60 days, a consultation plan addressing affected communities.
Stage 4 involves the potential installation of around 10 production units and the drilling of more than 130 wells in deepwater, with first oil previously expected from 2026. With the suspension in place, Petrobras cannot advance project-related activities tied to the license.
The case adds to a series of recent legal and regulatory interventions affecting environmental licensing processes in Brazil, particularly in projects with coastal interface and social impact exposure.
Why it matters
– Enforcement of consultation requirements under Convention 169 – Licensing process subject to judicial review – Increased scrutiny over environmental and social procedures
Market impact
– Potential revision of pre-salt project timelines – Greater regulatory and judicial scrutiny risk – Higher compliance requirements for offshore operators
On March 24, 2026, Equinor initiated drilling activities for the Raia offshore gas project in the Campos Basin. The development, estimated at around US$9 billion, is expected to begin production in 2028, with projected output of approximately 16 million cubic meters of gas per day and 126,000 barrels per day of oil and condensate.
The project could supply close to 15% of Brazil’s domestic gas demand and marks the transition from project planning to execution phase, reinforcing Equinor’s integrated position across offshore gas and onshore renewables in Brazil.
The return of Milan Tide, now Seastar Virtus, should have been a straightforward story: a well-built PSV, revived, reintroduced and ready to operate again. It turns out the story is not quite that simple.
Following our publication, Astromarítima Navegação S.A. – em Recuperação Judicial approached us demanding the rectification of a specific point: according to them, the vessel was not sold to Seastar, but rather placed under a bareboat charter agreement.
Here, the space is duly given, and the clarification made public.
However, context matters. The interpretation adopted in our original article was not speculative. It was grounded in publicly available signals, including Seastar’s own communication referring to Seastar Virtus as “our vessel, baptized Seastar Virtus”—language that, in any market, reasonably implies control consistent with ownership or quasi-ownership structures.
If the structure is indeed a bareboat charter, the natural question is: where is this reflected?
The answer, at least for now, is that it is not.
A verification with ANTAQ introduces a different layer to the story. The vessel—still referenced as CMT Matos and legally tied to Astromarítima Navegação S.A. – em Recuperação Judicial according to their statement—appears, in parallel, to be featured under a bareboat charter to Oceanica, forming part of its registered fleet and contributing to its tonnage and REB framework.
This raises a straightforward, but unavoidable question.
If Seastar has, for months, been the charterer of the same vessel under a bareboat charter agreement with Astromarítima Navegação S.A. – em Recuperação Judicial, how is it that the very same unit is also chartered—and formally registered—as part of Oceanica’s fleet?
Different names, same steel.
A vessel cannot, in practical and regulatory terms, be subject to two concurrent bareboat structures serving distinct operators, particularly when such arrangements underpin fleet composition and REB-linked tonnage rights.
We remain open to receiving any documentation that reconciles these elements, and will continue to examine this and similar cases, as the situation raises a broader question as to how such structures are being implemented in practice—and whether they are consistent with the applicable regulatory framework.
When approached, ANTAQ did not deny the underlying information, but opted not to take a definitive position, noting that a conclusive answer would require further analysis and consolidation of data.
Brazil’s Ministry of Ports and Airports (MPor), through the Merchant Marine Fund Directing Council (CDFMM), approved a package of 13 projects totalling R$ 6 billion in investments at its 62nd Ordinary Meeting, held on March 18. The approved portfolio is expected to generate approximately 2,800 direct jobs and enable 95 projects across the naval and port sectors.
The two largest projects together account for over R$ 4.3 billion of the total approved. Porto Central, a deep-water port development in the state of Espírito Santo, received approval for R$ 2.18 billion in port infrastructure investment, reinforcing the country’s logistics capacity along the southeastern coast. Close behind, Petrobras secured R$ 2.17 billion for the construction of four vessels designed to carry petroleum derivatives — a move aligned with the company’s strategy to expand its own fleet and reduce exposure to chartering costs. The third largest project was awarded to GDE Transportes, which will receive R$ 380.3 million for the construction of 35 vessels for fuel transportation in Brazil’s North region, where waterway transport is structurally critical to local supply chain operations.
BNDES (Source: Courtesy)
Beyond vessel construction, the approved portfolio covers inland navigation, maritime support vessels, and cargo shipping, as well as maintenance, repair and modernisation works at shipyards across several Brazilian states. New project submissions can be presented until April 20, 2026, and approved projects will have up to 450 days — extendable by a further 180 days — to finalise financing agreements with qualified lending institutions, including BNDES, Banco do Brasil, Banco da Amazônia, Banco do Nordeste and Caixa Econômica Federal.
The 63rd Ordinary Meeting of the CDFMM is scheduled for June 18, 2026. The approval comes amid a consistent acceleration of the Fund: throughout 2025, the FMM approved R$ 31.8 billion spread across more than 700 projects, with projections for 2026 pointing to up to R$ 34 billion in new approvals.
The scale and pace of FMM approvals in 2026 reflect a deliberate policy shift, one that elevates port and naval infrastructure to a strategic pillar of national competitiveness — rather than treating it merely as a regional development tool. The concentration of over 70% of this latest round in just two projects (Porto Central and Petrobras’ fleet expansion) signals a clear preference for priority investments, which is a coherent approach given the Fund’s leverage potential. However, the success of this agenda will ultimately depend on execution: the sector’s track record of converting approvals into operational vessels and functional port terminals within contractual deadlines remains a legitimate concern — and one the market is watching with a degree of skepticism.
No changes were recorded across ongoing offshore tenders. Current opportunities remain active under previously disclosed terms and deadlines.
What has changed?
– No updates.
What else is happening?
– Petrobras is monitoring fuel supply dynamics after at least six vessels carrying refined fuels changed destination, as domestic pricing below import parity continues to impact import flows and delay cargo discharge decisions.
– Transpetro – Petrobras Transporte S. A. is expanding its commercial activity beyond Petrobras, securing new contracts with Trafigura and Ipiranga, signaling gradual diversification in Brazil’s shipping market.
– Petrobras awarded long-term turbomachinery service agreements to Baker Hughes, covering multiple offshore and onshore assets, reinforcing maintenance and reliability strategies across its portfolio.
– Offshore vessel demand remains supported by recent contract awards, with Oceanica securing multi-year agreements with Petrobras totaling approximately USD 736 million for subsea and support vessel operations.
– Brazil’s Merchant Marine Fund (FMM) approved approximately BRL 6 billion in new projects across shipbuilding, logistics and port infrastructure, supporting future demand for domestic offshore and maritime assets.
– Edison Chouest Offshore announced a shareholder movement involving its Brazilian operations, signaling continued strategic positioning by international players in Brazil’s offshore support vessel market.
Building 10,000 relevant followers — in a niche, technical, and relationship-driven industry — is something else.
We’ve just passed this milestone on LinkedIn. A fully organic, highly segmented audience, built with consistency and attention to what this market actually values: reliable information, technical depth, and real insight.
At WSB Advisors, the focus has never been volume. It’s always been quality — of data, of analysis, and of the conversations we help drive across the offshore and maritime sectors.
This is reflected across everything we do: from Westhon Media and One Energy Magazine to our intelligence platform WSB One.
We don’t chase headlines. We build context. Because in this market, DataMatters.
To everyone who follows and engages with us — thank you. You are part of a network that values substance over noise.
There is a certain seduction in simple narratives.
Petrobras sold a 50% stake in Tartaruga Verde and the Module III of Espadarte to PETRONAS in 2019 for roughly US$1.2 billion. Six years later, it is buying that same stake back for approximately US$450 million. The conclusion, widely circulated in market commentary, appears self-evident: Petrobras sold high, PETRONAS bought high — and then sold low.
It is a compelling story. It is also, on closer inspection, fundamentally misleading.
What appears to be a case of value destruction is, in reality, a case of value extraction — and a useful lens through which to understand how capital has actually been deployed in Brazil’s upstream sector.
The first source of confusion lies in the numbers themselves. The US$1.2 billion headline in 2019 incorporated economic adjustments, including cash flows generated between the effective date and closing, implying a lower underlying asset valuation. The repurchase price today is likewise subject to interim performance adjustments. Even after normalising for these effects, however, PETRONAS is exiting at a lower nominal price than it entered.
But upstream economics are not determined at entry or exit alone. They are determined in the years in between — in the conversion of reserves into cash.
When PETRONAS acquired its stake, Tartaruga Verde was at a particularly attractive point in its lifecycle. Capital expenditure had largely been deployed, production was near peak, and the asset was transitioning into a cash-generative phase. For a non-operating partner, this is precisely where value tends to concentrate.
Over the following years, that positioning proved advantageous. Production remained resilient in the early period, oil prices recovered sharply post-pandemic, and the asset delivered exposure to offshore barrels without incremental capital burden. In effect, PETRONAS did not simply acquire reserves in the ground, but barrels already in motion — and monetised them at favourable points in the cycle.
By the time of exit, the picture had shifted. Production had declined, the asset had matured, and the remaining reserves offered a less intense near-term cash profile. To focus on the exit price without accounting for the cash extracted along the way is to miss the central economic logic of the transaction.
Our analysis suggests that PETRONAS likely recovered its initial investment through cumulative cash flows over the holding period. The exit price, therefore, should be seen not as the return itself, but as what remained after the return had already been realised. This is closer in nature to a private equity-style strategy: enter post-development, harvest cash during a favourable cycle, and exit before the steeper phase of decline. Such strategies are not designed to maximise terminal value, but to optimise internal rate of return — and on that measure, the transaction stands out.
Placing this deal within the broader Brazilian M&A landscape reinforces the point. Mapping transactions across execution risk and expected returns reveals a wide dispersion of outcomes. A small subset of deals — typically driven by timing or targeted operational intervention — cluster in the high-return, controlled-risk quadrant. PETRONAS’ investment in Tartaruga Verde fits squarely within this group. Others, driven by scale or consolidation, tend to deliver more institutional returns, while more complex portfolios — often involving operational integration or technical challenges — carry higher risk without necessarily offering proportionate upside.
Within this framework, Petrobras’ re-entry sits in a different category altogether. The implied returns are more moderate, but the rationale is not primarily financial arbitrage. Rather, it reflects a strategic decision to consolidate control over a producing asset in which the company is already operator, simplifying governance and potentially unlocking operational synergies across its portfolio.
This distinction is essential. PETRONAS approached the asset as an investor, optimising for cash yield and timing. Petrobras is approaching it as an operator and long-term holder, optimising for control and integration. The same barrels can support different valuations depending on the strategy applied to them.
More broadly, the transaction exemplifies a recurring feature of the Brazilian upstream market: asset quality alone does not determine outcomes. Several of the most successful deals in recent years have involved mature or technically complex fields. What differentiates performance is not geology, but execution — and, in some cases, simply timing. The same asset, under different operators or strategies, can produce materially different returns.
Viewed in this light, the Petrobras–PETRONAS sequence is less a contradiction than a transition. In 2019, Petrobras divested a non-core stake to optimise its balance sheet, while PETRONAS entered to capture yield. In 2025, those roles have effectively reversed: PETRONAS exits after harvesting value, and Petrobras re-enters to reinforce its core portfolio. Both decisions are internally consistent. The perceived asymmetry arises only when they are judged through the same lens.
The broader lesson is straightforward, if often overlooked. In upstream oil and gas, value is rarely created at a single point in time. It is created along the production curve — through timing, execution, and strategic alignment.
For those focused solely on headline prices, the Petrobras–PETRONAS deal may appear puzzling. For those looking at the full economic cycle, it is something else entirely:
A well-executed trade on one side, and a strategic repositioning on the other.
What else?
“Coming soon…
I’ve seen a number of takes suggesting that PETRONAS “lost money” on this deal — buying high and selling low.
The reality is quite the opposite.
When you properly unpack the cash flows, timing, and production profile, this turns out to be one of the most efficient upstream trades executed in Brazil in recent years.
Following this divestment, PETRONAS would rank 1 in my Brazil oil and gas deal league table — not despite the exit price, but because of it.
As for Petrobras, the narrative is more nuanced.
Selling at ~US$1.2 billion and re-entering at a fraction of that does not, in itself, define value creation or destruction. The economics sit beneath the headline numbers — and the strategic rationale is far more complex than the surface suggests.
More to come.”, reflects Alexandre Vilela, CEO of WSB Advisors.
PRIO reported that it has received from Ibama an amended drilling license for the Frade Field. With this authorization, the company will be able to drill up to 14 new wells in the asset, located in the Campos Basin.
The operation is expected to be carried out using the offshore drilling unit Hunter Queen, capable of operating in deepwater environments and supporting both drilling and intervention campaigns. The unit was acquired by PRIO from Foresea in 2022. The field is currently operated by the FPSO Valente, which has a production capacity of up to 100,000 barrels per day. In the fourth quarter of 2025, Frade recorded an average production of approximately 31,500 barrels per day.
The unit is characterized as a 6th-generation semi-submersible drilling rig equipped with dynamic positioning, capable of operating in water depths of up to 3,000 meters and supporting complex offshore drilling campaigns. Built in 2011 in Singapore, it can accommodate around 180 personnel.
PRIO also stated that it will disclose the schedule for the new drilling activities in due course.
