The name Skandi Copacabana became associated with an important phase of offshore support navigation in Brazil.
Before operating under that name, the vessel was registered as Norskan Copacabana. Built in 2005 at Estaleiro Ilha, in Rio de Janeiro, she emerged during a period of expansion in the Brazilian offshore market, when demand for support vessels was growing alongside the development of exploration and production activities in the country.
The vessel was designed as an AHTS, a category focused on anchor handling, towing and supply operations. In practical terms, this type of asset is used to tow offshore units, deploy and recover anchoring systems, and provide logistical support to offshore operations.
With approximately 80.5 meters in length, around 18 meters of beam and a deadweight close to 2,400 tonnes, the vessel was part of a generation of offshore support vessels built to serve a market that demanded more power, deck capacity and operational resources. The UT 722L design, the reported bollard pull of approximately 206 tonnes and the anchor handling systems reinforced this profile.
But the relevance of the Skandi Copacabana is not limited to her technical characteristics. She also helps tell part of the evolution of the Brazilian offshore support market.
In the 2000s, Brazil was experiencing a cycle of offshore expansion. Vessel construction in the country, the presence of international groups and the growing demand for offshore support created space for a more robust and specialized fleet. The then Norskan Copacabana was born within that environment.
Later, already as Skandi Copacabana, the vessel carried the operational identity linked to Norskan/DOF in Brazil, at a time when the group maintained a relevant presence in offshore support navigation.
The most relevant change came from 2015.
At that time, funds managed by Mantiq Investimentos and Mare Investimentos acquired five offshore support vessels from Norskan Offshore in Brazil. Among them were the PSVs Skandi Stolmen and Skandi Yare, the OSRV Skandi Leblon, the PSV Skandi Flamengo and the AHTS Skandi Copacabana.
In 2016, Marlin Navegação was authorized by ANTAQ to operate as a Brazilian shipping company in offshore support navigation. From that restructuring, the Skandi Copacabana became part of a new corporate and operational configuration within the Brazilian market.
That movement helps explain a change of phase in the sector. Part of the fleet built or incorporated during the expansion cycle began to be repositioned in a more selective market, pressured by fleet adjustments, contract renegotiations, shifts in demand and greater operational discipline among shipowners.
Today, the former Skandi Copacabana appears in public records as Marlin Copacabana, IMO 9283435, under the Brazilian flag. The vessel remains associated with Marlin Navegação and appears in recent publications as part of the fleet operated by Grupo Bravante.
The asset retains its original AHTS profile. In other words, it continues to be identified as an offshore support vessel focused on towing, anchor handling and logistical support. Public AIS records indicate recent presence along the Brazilian coast, but this alone does not confirm a specific contract, client or operational scope.
In the case of the Marlin Copacabana, the interest lies precisely in the reading that the vessel allows us to make of the market. Her trajectory crosses different phases of the Brazilian offshore sector: local construction, operation under the Skandi brand, sale to a new corporate structure, integration into Marlin and later operational association with Bravante.
That is why we chose to talk about her. Not only to locate a vessel that changed names, but to observe, through her, how the Brazilian offshore support market has also changed.
On Sunday, Brazil and Norway will meet on the football pitch. In the offshore industry, however, the relationship between the two countries has long been built on partnership.
Over the years, Norway has become one of Brazil’s most important offshore partners. From operators and shipowners to subsea specialists, engineering companies and classification societies, Norwegian expertise has played a significant role in the development of Brazil’s offshore sector. Companies such as Equinor, DOF, DNV, BW Offshore, Kongsberg Maritime and OneSubsea are now an integral part of this ecosystem.
According to the Norway in Brazil: Investment and Trade Report 2025, nearly 300 Norwegian companies operate in Brazil, supporting approximately 120,000 jobs and representing almost US$14 billion in accumulated investments. Offshore energy remains one of the strongest pillars of this long-standing relationship.
At WSB Advisors, this connection has always been part of our journey. In 2024, WSB Advisors partnered with the NBCC – Norwegian Brazilian Chamber of Commerce to hold the WSB Advisors Seminar alongside the Norway–Brazil Business Forum at the Copacabana Palace. The event brought together senior executives, institutional representatives and industry leaders from Brazil and Norway to discuss offshore investment, energy transition and the future of bilateral cooperation, reinforcing the long-standing relationship between the two countries and highlighting the importance of forums that bring together decision-makers from across the industry.
The dialogue will continue at the next edition of the WSB Advisors Seminar, scheduled for September 23, 2026, bringing together many of the executives, companies and institutions helping shape the future of the offshore industry.
Attendance will once again be limited. Companies interested in sponsorship opportunities and professionals interested in attending are invited to contact the WSB Advisors team.
MODEC and Eld Energy have signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a 1.2 MW solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC)-based power system integrated with carbon capture for future FPSO applications.
Under the agreement, Eld Energy will lead the design, procurement and construction of the SOFC-based power system, while MODEC will develop the carbon capture facility and integrate the combined system into future FPSOs. Land-based testing is scheduled for 2029, followed by a long-term demonstration program aimed at reducing carbon emissions from offshore power generation.
Petrobras announced that the Búzios field, located in the pre-salt Santos Basin, set a new production record by reaching an average of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day on June 26, just three days after surpassing the historic milestone of 1.1 million bpd.
According to the company, the increase was driven by the continued ramp-up of the P-78 and P-79 FPSOs, which are progressing toward their nameplate production capacity of 180,000 barrels of oil per day each.
Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade) has approved, without restrictions, the proposed merger between Subsea7 and Saipem.
The transaction, which will combine Saipem and Subsea7 into one of the world’s largest offshore engineering and construction groups, was reviewed for its potential impact on Brazil’s subsea installation and maintenance services market. Cade concluded that the combination does not raise significant competition concerns in the country’s offshore oil and gas sector, marking another regulatory milestone for the transaction.
Stay informed on key offshore developments — visit wsb-one.com, our data platform trusted by leading offshore companies.
Brazil’s Búzios pre-salt field reached a record average production of 1.1 million barrels of oil per day, surpassing the previous milestone of 1 million bpd achieved in October 2025.
Operated by Petrobras in the Santos Basin, Búzios is Brazil’s largest producing offshore oil field and accounts for nearly one-third of Petrobras’ operated production in Brazil. Petrobras expects production to continue increasing as additional wells and production units enter operation.
Stay informed on key offshore developments — visit wsb-one.com, our data platform trusted by leading offshore companies.
The MSC Baltic III was sailing off the west coast of Newfoundland, Canada, when it reported a loss of power near the entrance to Bay of Islands. Sea and weather conditions were adverse. Unable to secure an anchor, the containership eventually ran aground in the Wild Cove/Cedar Cove area, near Lark Harbour.
There were 20 crew members on board. All were safely airlifted from the vessel.
From that moment, the MSC Baltic III was no longer just another containership in commercial operation. It became one of the most closely monitored maritime cases in Canada.
More than a year later, the vessel is no longer being treated as a simple refloating case. The operation has moved into the wreck removal phase, with deconstruction work being carried out on site, land access being developed, and materials gradually removed from the vessel.
The initial response focused on crew safety, environmental protection, hull assessment, fuel removal and cargo removal. From the early inspections, the situation already pointed to a sensitive operation. There were reports of water ingress in some compartments, signs of structural deformation and a significant portion of the hull resting on the seabed.
As the months passed, the vessel’s condition became the main technical factor in the operation. Updates from the Canadian Coast Guard indicated hull damage, cracks, deformation, access limitations and repeated restrictions caused by sea state, wind, ice and severe weather.
By late February 2025, the Canadian authority indicated that, given the vessel’s condition at that stage, it could not be safely refloated. From then on, the discussion was no longer only about pulling power, buoyancy and emergency response. The case began to involve structural integrity, environmental risk, access logistics and the real feasibility of safe removal.
In 2026, the operation entered a new phase. Resolve Marine was retained as the contractor for the wreck removal stage. By June, the work had already progressed into the deconstruction phase, with increased operational presence on site, improvements to land access to Cedar Cove, construction of an access road down to the beach area and removal of materials from the vessel.
Built in 2003, the MSC Baltic III is a containership of significant size for this type of coastal operation. The vessel is approximately 207 meters long, about 30 meters wide and has a capacity close to 2,500 TEU. These figures help put the challenge into perspective: this is not a small vessel, but a large commercial ship grounded in an exposed area with limited operational access.
This is where the Canadian case becomes relevant to the maritime and offshore markets.
Without drawing a direct comparison, the MSC Baltic III offers a useful reference for situations such as the Skandi Amazonas in Brazil. In grounding cases, time is a technical factor. The longer a hull remains exposed, the greater the influence of sea conditions, weather, structural condition, access, environmental risk and removal feasibility.
Refloating, in these cases, does not depend only on pulling power. It depends on hull integrity, watertight condition, pollution control, weather windows, available logistics and the ability to move the vessel without turning the operation into a greater risk.
WSB Advisors is pleased to announce the upcoming 8th edition of the WSB Advisors Seminar, our flagship event dedicated to Brazil’s offshore and maritime industries.
Over the years, the seminar has established itself as a high-level forum, bringing together investors, CEOs, presidents, directors and senior executives to discuss the issues shaping the future of the sector. Through carefully curated panel discussions, the event provides a unique opportunity to exchange perspectives on market trends, strategic challenges and the outlook for the offshore industry.
The seminar is intentionally designed for a limited audience, ensuring a highly qualified environment for discussions, business development and strategic relationships.
Attendance will be limited.
Companies interested in sponsorship opportunities and professionals interested in attending are invited to contact the WSB Advisors team.
Further information regarding the event, including the venue, agenda, speakers and participation details, will be announced soon.
A rebelião no chão de escritório da Capital Marítima
O primeiro sinal visível de uma crise de governança nem sempre é uma petição judicial. Às vezes, é um escritório vazio.
Na Capital Marítima, empresa de apoio marítimo offshore recentemente criada e ligada ao Ace Defender, funcionários de terra declararam greve após alegarem assédio moral, intimidação e quebra da confiança no ambiente de trabalho. O que começou como uma disputa pelo controle societário agora se transformou em uma crise trabalhista.
Em mensagem analisada pela Westhon Media, o comando de greve afirmou que os trabalhadores votaram pela paralisação imediata das atividades para preservar sua integridade física e mental. A comunicação descreveu o ambiente de trabalho como tóxico e informou que uma nova assembleia seria realizada na segunda-feira, 29 de junho, na sede do sindicato, para decidir se a greve continuará. A mensagem também mencionou o Ministério Público do Trabalho e a expectativa de ajuizamento de ações trabalhistas.
As alegações não se limitam a tensões comuns de escritório. Funcionários afirmam que o ambiente mudou após a chegada de uma nova frente administrativa que passou a atuar dentro da empresa. Relatos analisados descrevem a presença de seguranças armados, funcionários se sentindo observados e seguidos ao atender ligações telefônicas, e contatos ordinários com a administração original sendo tratados como suspeitos. Funcionários também afirmam que boletins de ocorrência foram registrados.
Leonardo e Gloria são mencionados em comunicações dos empregados como integrantes da nova direção da empresa. O tom das reclamações chama atenção. Os trabalhadores não estão tratando o caso como uma disputa por salários ou benefícios. Eles descrevem medo, pressão e desconfiança dentro do que antes era um escritório familiar e operacional.
O contexto jurídico é importante, mas mais limitado do que algumas comunicações corporativas sugerem. A disputa envolvendo a Capital Marítima tramita em segredo de justiça e surgiu de uma medida urgente ligada a uma disputa arbitral mais ampla. O material judicial conhecido aponta para uma tutela provisória — uma liminar temporária — e não para uma decisão final sobre o mérito do controle societário. Em estágio anterior, o juízo adotou um arranjo de administração conjunta, não uma transferência definitiva e limpa de comando.
Essa distinção importa. Uma liminar temporária pode alterar assinaturas e direitos de consentimento. Ela não resolve a disputa de fundo. Tampouco autoriza que uma transição contestada seja imposta no ambiente de trabalho — muito menos pelo medo.
A Capital Marítima não é uma empresa abstrata. Sua relevância está no Ace Defender, embarcação de apoio offshore voltada a uma operação com a Petrobras. Fontes do setor afirmam que a transferência da embarcação da Galáxia Marítima para a Capital Marítima permanece comercialmente sensível porque a Galáxia, como contratada original, ainda pode estar exposta a obrigações relacionadas à Petrobras caso surjam interrupções operacionais, multas ou falhas de desempenho.
O caso também envolve a Belov, empresa brasileira com a qual a Capital Marítima firmou arranjos ligados à tonelagem local e à estrutura do REB que sustenta a bandeira brasileira do Ace Defender. Isso não é um detalhe lateral. No apoio marítimo offshore, a engrenagem menos glamorosa costuma ser justamente aquilo que torna o negócio real: o contrato voltado à Petrobras, a embarcação, a bandeira, o suporte de tonelagem, as contrapartes locais e a equipe de terra capaz de manter a estrutura em conformidade.
Visto dessa forma, o contraste é marcante. A arquitetura empresarial anterior parece ter sido construída em torno de uma plataforma operacional brasileira financiável: compromissos capitalizados, contrapartes locais reconhecidas e uma embarcação posicionada para trabalho com a Petrobras. O estilo de gestão recém-chegado e a disputa, conforme descritos por funcionários e pessoas familiarizadas com a empresa, parecem o oposto: forte presença de segurança, opacidade, dependência de uma estrutura societária estrangeira frouxa e linhas incertas de autoridade dentro do escritório brasileiro.
Há também uma questão de conformidade. A Westhon Media foi informada de que cidadãos estrangeiros participaram de instruções a empregados e de diretrizes internas. A base registral para tal atuação, e se essas pessoas estavam autorizadas a realizar algo além de visitas comerciais, permanece pouco clara. A questão não é nacionalidade. O Brasil permite visitas de negócios. A linha é cruzada quando visitantes passam de reuniões e supervisão comercial para uma administração de fato: dirigir empregados, controlar rotinas internas, supervisionar acessos, coletar informações operacionais ou emitir instruções.
O mesmo se aplica à segurança. Se seguranças foram mobilizados, as perguntas relevantes são simples: quem os contratou, se a empresa e os profissionais estavam devidamente autorizados, se armas eram portadas legalmente e se sua presença tinha caráter protetivo ou coercitivo. No contexto atual, a segurança no escritório não é um detalhe de fundo. Ela está no centro do relato de intimidação feito pelos empregados.
Então há a Libéria.
A pretensão do lado estrangeiro passa pela Constance Maritime Corp., um veículo societário domiciliado na Libéria. Nada disso é ilegal por si só. A navegação está cheia de veículos offshore, holdings e estruturas marítimas ligadas à tradição grega. Mas, em uma operação voltada à Petrobras, a opacidade não é neutra. Uma cadeia de propriedade com aparência de empresa-veículo torna ainda mais importante saber quem está dando instruções no Brasil, quem financia a operação, quem autorizou a segurança e quem responde perante empregados, fornecedores e clientes.
Esse invólucro societário de estilo grego importa justamente porque é familiar. No transporte marítimo, estruturas assim podem ser rotineiras. Em uma crise trabalhista, elas também podem tornar mais difícil localizar a responsabilidade. A questão para a Capital Marítima já não é apenas se um acionista estrangeiro possui direitos sob uma ordem judicial provisória. É se as pessoas que atuam sob esse guarda-chuva têm legitimidade para dirigir uma força de trabalho brasileira, perturbar uma operação sob bandeira brasileira e interferir nos arranjos locais que tornaram o Ace Defender comercialmente viável desde o início.
Executivos seniores da Capital Marítima contatados confirmaram, em linhas gerais, o estado de coisas descrito pelos empregados. Nenhuma contestação substancial foi apresentada até o momento. O novo grupo de gestão recém-chegado ainda não pôde ser alcançado para comentários.
A assembleia de segunda-feira, dia 29, agora testará se a greve se transformará em uma confrontação mais ampla — ou se, como empregados dizem ter sido supostamente ameaçado em uma comunicação de gestão atribuída a Leonardo, os grevistas serão tratados como ausentes injustificados, demitidos e substituídos imediatamente.
Para a Capital Marítima, a questão já não é apenas quem controla a companhia no papel. É se os empregados acreditam que podem voltar ao trabalho sem intimidação — e se a Petrobras e o mercado offshore podem confiar na cadeia de comando por trás do Ace Defender.
——————————————————-
Ace Defender (Source: Capital)
The first visible sign of a governance crisis is not always a court filing. Sometimes it is an empty office.
At Capital Marítima, the recently established offshore support company linked to the Ace Defender, shore-based employees have declared a strike after alleging moral harassment, intimidation and a breakdown of workplace trust. What began as a corporate control dispute has now become a labour crisis.
In a message reviewed by Westhon Media, the strike command said workers had voted to stop activities immediately to preserve their physical and mental integrity. The communication described the workplace as toxic and said a new assembly would be held on Monday, June 29, at the union office, to decide whether the strike should continue. It also referred to the Public Labour Prosecutor’s Office and to expected labour claims.
The allegations are not confined to ordinary office tension. Employees say the atmosphere changed after a newly arrived administrative front began operating inside the company. Accounts reviewed describe the presence of armed security personnel, staff feeling watched and followed when taking phone calls, and ordinary contact with the original admin staff being treated as suspect. Employees also say police reports have been filed.
Leonardo and Gloria are referred to in employee communications as part of the new direction of the company. The tone of the complaints is notable. Workers are not framing the issue as a dispute over salaries or benefits. They are describing fear, pressure and distrust inside what had been a familiar operating office.
The legal background is important, but more limited than some corporate messaging suggests. The dispute involving Capital Marítima is under judicial secrecy and arose from an urgent measure connected to a broader arbitration fight. The known court material points to provisional relief — a temporary injunction — rather than a final decision on the merits of corporate control. At an earlier stage, the court adopted a joint administration arrangement, not a clean final transfer of command.
That distinction matters. A temporary injunction may change signatures and consent rights. It does not settle the underlying dispute. Nor does it license a contested transition to be pushed through the workplace, leave aside, by fear.
Capital Marítima is not an abstract company. Its relevance lies in the Ace Defender, a Petrobras-facing offshore support vessel. Industry sources say the vessel’s move from Galáxia Marítima to Capital Marítima remains commercially sensitive because Galáxia, as original contractor, may still face exposure under Petrobras-related obligations if operational disruption, fines or performance failures arise.
The case also involves Belov, the Brazilian company with which Capital Marítima entered arrangements tied to local tonnage and the REB structure supporting the Ace Defender’s Brazilian flag. That is not a side issue. In offshore support, the unglamorous machinery is often what makes the business real: the Petrobras-facing contract, the vessel, the flag, the tonnage support, the local counterparties and the shore team able to keep the structure compliant.
Seen that way, the contrast is stark. The earlier business architecture appears to have been built around a bankable Brazilian operating platform: funded commitments, recognised local counterparties and a vessel positioned for Petrobras work. The newly arrived management style and dispute, as described by employees and people familiar with the company, looks like the opposite: security-heavy, opaque, dependent on a loose foreign corporate setup and uncertain lines of authority inside the Brazilian office.
There is also a compliance question. Westhon Media have been informed that foreign nationals have taken part in employee instructions and internal directives. The registration basis for such activity, and whether those individuals were authorised to perform anything beyond commercial visits, remains unclear. The issue is not nationality. Brazil allows business visits. The line is crossed when visitors move from meetings and commercial oversight into de facto management: directing employees, controlling internal routines, supervising access, collecting operational information or issuing instructions.
The same applies to security. If guards were deployed, the relevant questions are simple: who hired them, whether the company and personnel were properly authorised, whether weapons were lawfully carried, and whether their presence was protective or coercive. In the present context, security at the office is not a background detail. It sits at the centre of the employees’ account of intimidation.
Then there is Liberia.
The foreign-side claim runs through Constance Maritime Corp., a Liberia-domiciled corporate vehicle. None of that is unlawful by itself. Shipping is full of offshore vehicles, holding companies and Greek-linked maritime structures. But in a Petrobras-facing operation, opacity is not neutral. A shell-company-style ownership chain makes it more important, not less, to know who is giving instructions in Brazil, who is funding the operation, who authorised security, and who is accountable to employees, suppliers and clients.
This Greek-style corporate wrapper matters precisely because it is familiar. In shipping, such structures can be routine. In a labour crisis, they can also make accountability harder to locate. The question for Capital Marítima is no longer merely whether a foreign shareholder has rights under an interim court order. It is whether the people acting under that umbrella are entitled to direct a Brazilian workforce, disturb a Brazilian-flag operation and interfere with the local arrangements that made the Ace Defender commercially viable in the first place.
Senior Capital Marítima figures reached confirmed the broad state of affairs described by employees. No substantive contestation was offered at this time. The newly arrived management group could not be reached for comment as of yet.
The Monday 29 assembly will now test whether the strike hardens into a wider confrontation — or whether, as employees say was allegedly threatened in a management communication attributed to Leonardo, those on strike are treated as unjustified absentees, fired and replaced immediately.
For Capital Marítima, the issue is no longer only who controls the company on paper. It is whether employees believe they can return to work without intimidation — and whether Petrobras and the offshore market can trust the chain of command behind the Ace Defender.
The Libra Consortium, led by Petrobras, has signed a contract with the Electric Energy Research Center (CEPEL) to develop the Power Grid project, an initiative that will assess the feasibility of electrically interconnecting up to five FPSOs operating in the Mero Field, in Brazil’s Santos Basin pre-salt.
The two-year study will evaluate the technical and economic feasibility of creating an integrated offshore electrical network capable of sharing power between production units. The project will include assessments of submarine power cables, electrical equipment, control systems, grid stability and overall system reliability.
According to the consortium, the objective is to improve operational efficiency, increase energy reliability, reduce operating costs and lower greenhouse gas emissions across the field.
If successfully developed, the project could establish the technical foundation for future offshore electrical grid concepts in Brazil and potentially serve as a reference for other large-scale offshore developments worldwide.
